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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellants Sharon Craig Anderson and Colleen Craig Erickson ("Appellants") appeal 
a final Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in 
favor of Appellee Robert D. Irvine ("Appellee Irvine"). The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2), this matter having been 
transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that a deed executed in 1981 created 
both an exclusive life estate and a joint tenancy interest in real property in the grantor under 
the deed. The standard of review for this issue, as a conclusion of law, is that the trial court's 
findings be accorded no particular deference by the appellate court, but that they be reviewed 
for correctness.Truiillo v. Jenkins. 840 P.2d 777,778-79 (Utah 1992); Wadev. StangL 869 
P.2d9, 12 (Utah App. 1994). 
Issue 2. Whether the trial court, having found that a 1981 deed created both an 
exclusive life estate and a joint tenancy interest in the grantor of the real property, erred in 
denying cotenants an accounting for profits and expenses of the Property from the other 
cotenants. The standard of review for this issue, as a conclusion of law, is that the trial 
court's findings be accorded no particular deference by the appellate court, but that they be 
reviewed for correctness. Truiillo v. Jenkins, 840 P.2d 777, 778-79 (Utah 1992); Wade v. 
StangL 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1994). 
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Issue 3. Whether the trial court erred in appointing Appellee Irvine as receiver of the 
Property. The standard of review for this issue, as a conclusion of law, is that the trial court's 
findings be accorded no particular deference by the appellate court, but that they be reviewed 
for correctness. Winegar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provisions are determinative or of central importance to this 
appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-3: "A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass by a 
conveyance of real estate, unless it appears from the conveyance that a lesser estate 
was intended." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Appellants appeal a final Judgment of the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson of the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. This action arises under common 
law and statutory interpretation. 
Appellants will show (1) that Appellee Irvine is not entitled to a one-third interest as 
tenant in common in certain real property (the "Property"); (2) that, if Appellee Irvine is 
entitled to an interest in the Property, he must account to his cotenants for profits and 
expenses of the Property received or incurred by him; and (3) that Appellee Irvine may not 
be appointed receiver of the Property. 
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Appellants are entitled to have their title to the Property quieted from any claim of 
Appellee Irvine and are entitled to an accounting from Appellee Irvine for all profits and 
expenses of the Property received or incurred by him. Therefore, this Court should find that 
the trial court erred in awarding Appellee Irvine an interest in the Property, in denying 
Appellants an accounting from Appellee Irvine and in appointing Appellee Irvine receiver 
of the Property, 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Appellee Irvine brought suit against Appellants requesting (i) that the trial court 
partition the Property among the parties according to their respective rights; (ii) that the trial 
court order the sale of the Property and the division of the proceeds among the parties 
according to their respective rights; (iii) that the trial court enjoin Appellants [Defendants] 
from management of the Property; and (iv) that the trial court appoint a receiver for the 
Property in accordance with Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 66(b). 
Appellants answered the allegations of the Complaint denying the same and brought 
their counterclaim alleging: (1) that Appellee Irvine's ownership, if any, in the Property was 
extinguished upon the death of Ada Craig; (2) that Appellants are entitled to an accounting 
from Appellee Irvine during such periods for which he exercised control over the Property; 
and (3) that Appellants are entitled to judgment against Appellee Irvine for profits from and 
damages to the Property during such period for which he exercised control over the Property. 
Appellee Irvine answered the allegations of the Appellants' Counterclaim denying the 
same. 
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The matter was tried before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson on September 28-29, 
2004. The trial court rendered its decision orally in court on October 14, 2004. The 
Judgment of the trial court was entered on December 6, 2004. The trial court awarded 
Appellee Irvine a one-third interest as tenant in common in the Property with the remaining 
two-thirds held by Appellants; appointed Appellee Irvine receiver of the Property to sell the 
Property and divide the proceeds equally amount the owners; and awarded Appellee Irvine 
his costs. 
Appellants filed their Motion for Reconsideration on November 10,2004. A Minute 
Entry denying that motion was entered on December 9, 2004. 
Appellants filed their Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment on December 
20, 2004. A Minute Entry denying the Motion was entered on January 13, 2005. 
Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on February 22,2005. Appellants appeal the 
trial court's decision and ask this Court to reverse the trial court. 
Statement of Facts 
At the beginning of 1981, Ada Craig was the sole owner of real property located at 
251 East 1700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Property"). 
On or about January 19, 1981, Ada Craig conveyed the Property to Appellants by 
quitclaim deed, subject to a retained life estate (the "1981 Deed"). Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. 
The 1981 Deed states as follows: "Ada R. Craig ... hereby quit claims to Ada R. 
Craig, Sharon V. Craig [Sharon Craig Anderson] and Colleen R. Craig [Colleen Craig 
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Erickson] as Joint Tenants with foil rights of survivorship and not as tenants in common, 
reserving a Life Estate only for Ada R. Craig...." Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. 
On February 6, 1996, Ada Craig executed her last will and testament (the "1996 
Will"). See Defendants'Exhibit 19. 
In the 1996 Will, Ada Craig devised and bequeathed her estate in equal shares to 
Appellants, and specifically omitted any provision for her other children. The last paragraph 
of Article Fifth of the 1996 Will states: "I have intentionally and with foil knowledge 
omitted any provision for Robert Douglas Irvine [Appellee Irvine], Raymond Walker Irvine, 
Carolyn Kay Irvine Abbott [Carolyn Abbott], and Mark Albert Craig." 
On or about January 21, 1999, Ada Craig conveyed all of her interest in the Property 
to Carolyn Abbott by quitclaim deed (the "1999 Abbott Deed"). 
From approximately June 1999 until July 2003 Appellee Irvine assumed and 
maintained sole management and control of the Property. 
On or about May 20, 2002, Carolyn Abbott conveyed her interest in the Property to 
Appellee Irvine by Warranty Deed (the "2002 Irvine Deed"). 
Ada Craig died on July 11, 2003. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court erred in finding that the 1981 Deed created both an exclusive life 
estate and a joint tenancy interest in Ada Craig. An exclusive life estate is a present estate 
in real property while a joint tenancy is the concurrent ownership of a present estate in real 
property. These two estates are incompatible and cannot exist in the same property at one and 
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the same time. Ada Craig's intent in the 1981 Deed was to convey the Property to the 
Appellants upon her death. Therefore, this Court should find that upon Ada Craig's death, 
the Property vested exclusively in the Appellants. 
2. The trial court erred in denying Appellants an accounting for profits and expenses 
of the Property from their cotenants. Each cotenant is a fiduciary with regard to the 
remaining cotenants. Appellants are entitled as a matter of right to an accounting from 
Appellee Irvine who asserted that he was a cotenant. Therefore, this Court should find that 
Appellants are entitled to an accounting for their cotenancy. 
3. The trial court erred in appointing Appellee Irvine receiver of the Property. Rule 
66(b), addresses the appointment of a receiver. Rule 66(b) states that no party to an action 
shall be appointed receiver without the written consent of all parties to the action. Appellants 
did not consent, in writing or otherwise, to the appointment of Appellee Irvine as receiver. 
Therefore, this Court should find that Appellee Irvine may not be appointed receiver with 
respect to the Property. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 1981 DEED CREATED 
BOTH AN EXCLUSIVE LIFE ESTATE AND A JOINT TENANCY INTEREST IN THE 
GRANTOR. 
Appellants asked the trial court for an interpretation of the 1981 Deed finding that 
Appellants are the sole owners of the Property. The trial court instead found that the 1981 
Deed created both an exclusive life estate in Ada Craig and a joint tenancy among Ada Craig, 
Sharon and Colleen. 
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The Appellants argue and ask this Court to find that a grant of both an exclusive life 
estate and a joint tenancy interest by the 1981 Deed are inconsistent and incompatible 
interests. Appellants ask this Court to reconsider the 1981 Deed in this light. Construction 
of the 1981 Deed consistent with the trial court's ruling and findings regarding Ada Craig's 
intent will result in finding that Ada Craig retained a life estate, with a remainder interest in 
Appellants. 
Estates in Real Property 
Estates in real property may be considered in two classes: present estates and future 
estates. The 1981 Deed purports to create two separate present estates: first, to convey the 
Property to Ada Craig, Sharon and Colleen as joint tenants with rights of survivorship, and 
second, to reserve an exclusive life estate only for Ada Craig. For the reasons put forth by 
Appellants at trial, and reiterated here, the two actions which the 1981 Deed purports to 
accomplish are fundamentally incompatible and cannot coexist in real property. 
Concurrent estates are a division of real property ownership separate and distinct from 
the division into present and future estates. A concurrent interest is a present interest and 
exists whenever two or more persons have a concurrent and equal right to the possession and 
use of the same parcel of land. At common law there were five types of concurrent estates, 
three of which survive for all practical purposes today and one of which concerns us in this 
matter: the joint tenancy. 
"Joint tenants have one and the same interest, accruing by one and the same 
conveyance, commencing at one and the same time, and held by one and the same undivided 
possession. A joint tenancy is concurrent ownership of an estate in fee simple, fee-tail, for 
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life, for years, or at will, arising by grant to two or more persons." Black's Law Dictionary 
5th Edition, page 1313. The estates referred to in this definition are all present estates and not 
future estates. A joint tenancy is concurrent ownership of ^present [emphasis added] estate 
arising on the date of grant. A joint tenancy cannot be concurrent ownership of a future 
estate because the unities of joint ownership must be determined on the date of grant, not at 
some future date when the estate vests. Future estates such as remainders, reversions and 
executory interests are not held in joint tenancy. 
The 1981 Deed purports to grant concurrent ownership of an estate to Ada Craig, 
Sharon and Colleen. If the concurrent estate granted by the 1981 Deed is a present estate, 
it cannot coexist with an exclusive life estate. On the other hand, if the concurrent estate 
granted by the 1981 Deed is a future estate, it cannot by definition be held in joint tenancy. 
The trial court is unclear on this issue, stating on the one hand that "[T]he joint tenancy 
relationship means that all the joint tenants enjoy the property in its totality. They all have 
the right to enjoy the property in its entirety." While on the other hand stating "[A] life estate 
gives a person control over property for their life." A joint tenant cannot enjoy a property 
in its totality if a life tenant controls the property. Thus, if a joint tenancy and a life estate 
are to coexist as the trial court attempts to construe the 1981 Deed, then either the life estate 
or the joint tenancy must be less than the law makes them out to be. 
The arithmetic of real property is such that the sum of all of the interests equals a fee 
simple absolute. A life estate is a present estate which demands a future interest, whether by 
reverter, remainder or executory interest. A joint tenancy is a present estate held by 
concurrent ownership, with a built-in future interest in the survivor of the joint tenants. 
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Taken together, a life estate and a joint tenancy overlap and conflict with one another. The 
sum of the parts created by the 1981 Deed cannot be more or less than the whole of the 
interests in the Property. Thus, the trial court's finding that the 1981 Deed created both an 
exclusive life estate in Ada Craig and a joint tenancy in Ada Craig, Sharon and Colleen is 
flawed. 
If the terms "joint tenants" and "life estate" cannot be given their fair meanings 
without conflicting with one another, than the parties' intent is to be considered. The 1981 
Deed must be interpreted to give effect to Ada Craig's intent as found by the trial court. 
Ada Craig's Intent 
If the 1981 Deed is not clear on its face, the court looks to the intent of Ada Craig to 
determine the construction of the 1981 Deed. The Appellants ask this Court to reconsider 
its ruling in light of Ada Craig's intent. The trial court found "... that in 1981, Ada Craig 
wanted to have her house in which she held the sole interest go to her two daughters, Sharon 
and Colleen, upon her death." The trial court also found "... that Ada Craig intended to keep 
control and some ownership interest in her home, the property in question, until she died." 
If the trial court had interpreted the 1981 Deed in a manner consistent with the trial 
court's findings regarding Ada Craig's intent, then the trial court would have found that the 
1981 Deed created a present estate in Ada Craig for her life, a future estate in the form of a 
remainder in Sharon and Colleen, if they survive Ada Craig, and a possibility of reverter in 
Ada Craig and her heirs if both Sharon and Colleen predecease her. This interpretation is 
consistent with the arguments put forth by the Appellants at trial. Indeed, any other finding 
would defeat Ada Craig's intent. 
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The trial court suggested that a reason for Ada Craig having retained a joint tenancy 
interest in the Property was that in the event Sharon or Colleen predeceased Ada Craig, the 
Property would not go to their heirs. This is a presumption at best, given that no evidence 
of that was presented at trial. In addition, this rationale fails to recognize the legal point that 
any one of the joint tenants had the ability to sever the joint tenancy and to make their interest 
in the property transferable to their heirs or to a third party. In fact, this is exactly what 
resulted from the 1999 quitclaim deed to Carolyn Abbott; the trial court found that Carolyn 
Abbott received a 1/3 interest as tenant in common and not as a joint tenant. If Ada Craig 
really intended to preclude Appellants' heirs from obtaining an interest in the Property should 
they predecease her, a retained joint tenancy interest was not the way to accomplish that. In 
an attempt to address a condition that never occurred, that is that one of the Appellants might 
predecease Ada Craig, the trial court created a right for Ada Craig that was never intended, 
that is that Ada Craig conveyed less than all of the Property to Sharon and Colleen in the 
1981 Deed. 
Ada Craig intended to convey 100% of the Property to Sharon and Colleen. Whether 
Ada Craig intended to do so at the time of the 1981 Deed or at the time of her death doesn't 
really matter. The trial court found that this was Ada Craig's intent in 1981 and the evidence 
supports that as her intent at least until 1996 when she affirmed her intent in the 1996 Will. 
In the 1996 Will Ada Craig specifically devised and bequeathed her estate to the Appellants 
and specifically disinherited her other children, including Carolyn Abbott and Appellee 
Irvine. 
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This Court should interpret the 1981 Deed to give effect to Ada Craig's intent at the 
time she executed the deed in 1981, not her intent or state of mind as it might have been in 
1999. It is true that Ada Craig executed the 1999 Abbott Deed and that it was probably an 
expression of her intent in 1999. But that intent is irrelevant to an interpretation of the 1981 
Deed. 
Ada Craig retained control of the property during her lifetime with her life estate. As 
the Appellants argued with case law, statutory analysis and commentary, the 1981 Deed gave 
Ada Craig only a life estate and Appellants ask this Court to so find. 
Additional Analysis Supporting Appellants' Ownership of the Property 
Appellants assert that the 1981 Deed created only a life estate in the Property for Ada 
Craig. The joint tenancy language of the 1981 Deed as it relates to Ada Craig should be 
disregarded. A joint tenancy is a concurrent estate. A joint tenancy depends upon "four 
unities:" the unities of time, title, interest and possession. The unity of time means that the 
interests of the joint tenants must arise at the same time. The unity of title is present only if 
the interests are acquired by the same instrument. The unity of interest means that the tenants 
acquired identical interest, that is, in fee simple absolute or otherwise. The unity of 
possession means a common right of possession and enjoyment. 
If one joint tenant conveys his interest to a third party, the recipient acquires an 
interest as tenant in common with the remaining joint tenants, who, if more than one, 
continue as joint tenants among themselves. Such a conveyance is said to "sever" the joint 
tenancy as to the transferring party by removing the unities of time and title. Utah Code Ann. 
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§57-1-5(5). The important consequence of a severance is that the right of survivorship is 
destroyed between the original tenants and the new tenant. 
Ada Craig, the decedent, purported to create a joint tenancy among herself and her 
two daughters, the Appellants, pursuant to the 1981 Deed. The 1981 Deed states in relevant 
part that Ada Craig quitclaims to, 
"... ADA R. CRAIG, SHARON V. CRAIG [Anderson] and COLLEEN R. 
CRAIG [Erickson] as Joint Tenants with full rights of survivorship and not as 
tenants in common, reserving a Life Estate only for ADA R. CRAIG ..." 
in the subject Property. The language of the 1981 Deed contains both a granting clause and 
a habendum clause. "A granting clause is that portion of the deed or instrument of 
conveyance which contains the words of transfer of a present interest." Black's Law 
Dictionary 5th Edition, page 630. The granting language of the 1981 Deed conveys present 
title to the Property to Ada Craig and to her two daughters "as Joint Tenants with foil rights 
of survivorship and not as tenants in common,...." 
"A habendum clause is the clause usually following the granting part of the 
premises of a deed, which defines the extent of the ownership in the thing 
granted to be held and enjoyed by the grantee. The office of 'habendum' is 
properly to determine what estate or interest is granted by the deed, though 
office may be performed by the premises, in which case the habendum may 
lessen, enlarge, explain, or qualify, but not totally contradict or be repugnant 
to, the estate granted in the premises." Black's Law Dictionary 5th Edition, 
page 639. 
The restrictive or habendum language of the 1981 Deed states that it is "reserving a 
Life Estate only for ADA R. CRAIG...." In its Minute Entry Decision and Order relating to 
a Motion for Summary Judgment in this matter, the trial court observed that the interpretation 
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of the habendum language "reserving a Life Estate only for ADA R. CRAIG" is the crux of 
the disagreement between the parties. 
A. If traditional construction is applied, the habendum language restricts the granting 
language. Therefore, each of the three parties to the 1981 Deed received a joint tenancy 
interest in the Property, but Ada Craig's joint tenancy interest was restricted to a life estate 
only by the habendum clause, that is she was precluded from severing her joint tenancy 
interest and conveying anything more than her life estate. 
B. Looking to case law, no Utah case has been decided on this point. However, an 
analogous situation was considered by the Court of Appeals of North Carolina in Robinson 
v. King, 314 S. E. 2d 768 (N.C.App. 1984). In that case the grantor conveyed property to 
his sister by quitclaim deed. The relevant part of the quitclaim deed states, "... [grantors] 
have granted, bargained, sold and released, and by these presents do bargain, sell and release 
unto the said Maggie Robinson [the grantor's sister] all our right, title and interest in and to 
[the property].... To have and to hold, all and singular, the said premises before mentioned, 
unto the said Maggie Robinson, for and during the term of her natural life [emphasis 
added]." Robinson, supra, 314 S. E. 2d at 770. 
The North Carolina court noted that the granting clause of the quitclaim deed, 
standing alone, appears to give Maggie Robinson a fee simple estate, while the habendum 
clause, standing alone, appears to give her a life estate. Robinson, supra, 314 S. E. 2d at 769. 
This observation is similar to the instant case. The granting clause of the 1981 Deed, 
standing alone, appears to give Ada Craig a joint tenancy interest in a fee simple estate, while 
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the habendum clause of the 1981 Deed, standing alone, appears to give to Ada Craig a life 
estate. 
In Robinson, the defendants, being the proponents of a fee estate in the sister, 
presented evidence that the sister thought that she owned the property and that she attempted 
to convey the property by will. Robinson, supra, 314 S. E. 2d at 770. 
In the instant case, Appellee Irvine alleges that Ada Craig thought that she owned a 
concurrent fee simple estate in the Property and that she attempted to convey that interest in 
the Property. 
In Robinson, the North Carolina court found that the quitclaim deed should be 
interpreted to convey a life estate only to the sister and not a fee estate. The North Carolina 
court based its analysis on the relevant North Carolina statute, G.S. 39-1 which states: 
When real estate is conveyed to any person, the same shall be held and 
construed to be a conveyance in fee, whether the word "heir" is used or not, 
unless such conveyance in plain and express words shows, or it is plainly 
intended by the conveyance or some part thereof, that the grantor meant to 
convey an estate of less dignity. Robinson, supra, 314 S. E. 2d at 771. 
The Robinson court held that "[U]nder G. S. 39-1, the absence of words of inheritance, 
combined with the presence of language limiting the estate to the term of the grantee's life, 
should be interpreted to convey a life estate." The Robinson court noted that "[T]his result 
has been reached in other jurisdictions where a grant 'to A,' which standing alone would 
convey a fee, has been held to convey a life estte [sic] when the granting clause is 
accompanied by a habendum clause which refers to a life estate." Robinson, supra, 314 S. 
E. 2d at 771. See 4 H. Tiffany, The Law of Real Property §980 (3d. Ed. 1975). 
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The similar statute in the Utah Code is found at Utah Code Ann. §57-1-3 and states: 
"A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass by a conveyance of real estate, unless 
it appears from the conveyance that a lesser estate was intended." In the instant case, the 
1981 Deed makes reference to a concurrent fee simple title being conveyed in the granting 
clause, but it is also apparent from the language of the 1981 Deed that a lesser estate for Ada 
Craig was intended. 
C. A supporting interpretation is expressed in legal commentary which states that 
"[W]hen language in a deed or will would otherwise be effective to create a life estate but 
also contains additional language creating in the transferee a power, either limited or 
unlimited, to dispose of the land in fee simple, the prevailing rule in the United States is that 
the transferee has only a life estate despite the added power." Roger A. Cunningham, 
William B. Stoebuck and Dale A. Whitman, The Law of Property 67-68 (1993). Applying 
this analysis to the instant case, the 1981 Deed clearly creates a life estate in Ada Craig, the 
transferee, both through the express language and through the joint tenancy. In simplest 
terms, a joint tenancy is a life estate coupled with the power to sever the joint tenancy to 
create a life estate and a remainder interest. If the 1981 Deed is construed to create in Ada 
Craig a life estate, which it does by the granting clause and the habendum clause, together 
with the ability to create a remainder interest, then pursuant to the foregoing, the prevailing 
rule of construction would hold that Ada Craig had only a life estate, despite any additional 
ability to create a remainder interest. 
In light of the foregoing, this Court should find that Ada Craig's interest in the 
Property was a life estate only and that upon her death, the Property vested in the Appellants. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS' AN 
ACCOUNTING FOR PROFITS AND EXPENSES OF THE PROPERTY FROM THEIR 
COTENANTS. 
Each cotenant in real property is a fiduciary with regard to the remaining cotenants. 
Webster v.Knop. 6 Utah 2d 273, 312 P.2d 557 (1957); also McCreadv v. Fredericksem 41 
Utah 388, 126 P. 316 (1912). 
The doctrine of merger really has nothing to do with the reconciliation of incompatible 
estates. If the estates are incompatible, then the 1981 Deed must be interpreted to give effect 
to the intent of the Ada Craig, the grantor. However, the Trial court ruled based upon a 
finding that Ada Craig's life estate and the joint tenancy estates of Ada Craig, Sharon and 
Colleen are compatible and are separate, recognizable estates and therefore the issue of 
merger must be considered. 
Commenting on the issue of merger, the trial court noted that "[T]o the extent that one 
might say that a life estate and the joint tenancy estate in these circumstances are 
incompatible, I am of the opinion that because the joint tenancy estate is the greater estate, 
that the life estate would merge into it." 
The merger of property interests is defined as follows: "It is a general principle of law 
that where a greater estate and a less coincide and meet in one and the same person, without 
any intermediate estate, the less is immediately annihilated, sunk or drowned, in the greater." 
Black's Law Dictionary 5th Edition, page 892. 
The trial court denied the Appellants' claim for an accounting, presumably on the 
premise that the Appellants' interest in the Property was not a present interest but was subject 
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to Ada Craig's life estate. However, when Ada Craig conveyed all of her interest in the 
Property to Carolyn Abbott with the 1999 Abbott Deed, Ada Craig's interests, whatever the 
trial court may have interpreted them to be, were merged in Carolyn Abbott and the 
Appellants' interests in the Property, regardless of how the trial court may have subordinated 
them the exclusive life estate of Ada Craig, became a present interests. 
Based on the foregoing, the Appellants' interests in the Property became present 
interests on the date of the 1999 Abbott Deed, if not before. Appellants are entitled as a 
matter of right to an accounting from the date that their interests in the Property became 
present interests. Appellants have asserted that from the time of Ada Craig's readmission to 
the care center in January 1999 until her death in July 2003 they were excluded from the 
management of the Property and provided no accounting of the profits or expenses of the 
Property. 
Appellants urge this Court to acknowledge their present interest in the Property at 
least from the date of the 1999 quitclaim deed, if not before, and to award them their rights 
with respect to the Property by ordering Carolyn Abbott and Appellee Irvine to provide them 
with an accounting from the date of their present interest. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPOINTING APPELLEE IRVINE AS 
RECEIVER OF THE PROPERTY. 
In its ruling, the trial court appointed Appellee Irvine, the plaintiff in this matter,"... 
to act as receiver of the property, to undertake the sale of the property,...." Appellants object 
to Appellee Irvine's appointment as receiver and urge this Court to reconsider the 
appointment of Appellee Irvine as receiver. Appellants ask this Court to consider Utah R. 
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Civ. P., Rule 66 (b), which reads as follows: "Appointment of receiver. No party or attorney 
to the action, nor any person who is not entirely impartial and disinterested as to all the 
parties and the subject matter of the action can be appointed receiver therein without the 
written consent of all interested parties." 
Appellants have not consented in writing or otherwise to the appointment of Appellee 
Irvine as receiver, as required by Rule 66(b), and because of reservations which they have 
regarding such appointment they have declined to do so. Therefore, this Court should 
overturn the appointment of Appellee Irvine as receiver. 
The trial court awarded Appellee Irvine a 1/3 ownership in the Property. The 
Appellants have a 2/3 ownership in the Property. Notwithstanding Rule 66(b), it is contrary 
to the principles of equity to award a minority interest owner control over the Property. 
Appellee Irvine's appointment as receiver for the Property should be overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
An exclusive life estate is a present estate and a joint tenancy interest is the concurrent 
ownership of a present estate. A life estate and a joint tenancy are incompatible. Statute, 
case law and commentary lead to a reconciliation of the two with a finding that Ada Craig's 
interest in the Property resulting from the 1981 Deed was solely a life estate. In addition, if 
was the obvious intent of Ada Craig at the time of the 1981 Deed that she retain only a life 
estate. Therefore, upon the death of Ada Craig, her life estate terminated and the Property 
vested in Appellants, and this Court should so find. 
If this Court finds that Ada Craig retained some interest in the Property by the 1981 
Deed which extended beyond her lifetime, then under the principles of merger, her claim to 
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a life estate was extinguished and nonexistent and Appellants are entitled to an accounting 
for their interest in the Property from the date of the 1981 Deed or at least from the date of 
the 1999 Abbott Deed in which the interests merged in Carolyn Abbott, and this Court should 
so find. If this is the finding of this Court, then the matter should be remanded to the trial 
court for additional findings relating to an accounting for the Property. 
Utah R. Civ. Proc, Rule 66(b) bars Appellee Irvine from being the receiver of the 
Property, and this Court should so find. 
ADDENDUM 
No Addendum is necessary in this appeal. 
DATED September ? _ , 2005. SWENSEN & ANDERSEN PLLC 
HA^ 
James G. Swensen, Jr. ' 
Attorney for Defendants and Appellants 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DIVISION 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT D. IRVINE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHARON CRAIG ANDERSON and 
COLLEEN CRAIG ERICKSON, 
COMPLAINT 
Case No. QSO^Q OOO j 
JUDGE fW*< •©V-v 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff and complaints of the Defendants and for cause 
of action alleges as follows: 
1. This is an action to partition certain real property, more particularly 
hereinafter described, pursuant to the provisions of § 78-39-1, etseq., Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended). 
2. Plaintiff and Defendants are residents of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
3. The real property which is the subject of this litigation is situate in Salt 
Lake County, Utah, and is more particularly described as follows: 
16-18-181-013 Commencing 272.25 feet West from the 
Southeast comer of Lot 1, Block 12, 5 Acre Plat "A", Big Field 
Survey; thence West 66 feet; North 170.1 feet; East 66 feet; 
South 170.1 feet to the point of beginning. 
4. On January 19,1981, Ada Craig executed a quit claim deed to the 
above-described property conveying the same to herself, Sharon V. Craig (nka Sharon 
Anderson) and Colleen R. Craig (nka Colleen Erickson), as joint tenants, subject to a life 
estate in Ada Craig. Said deed was recorded on January 19,1981, in Book 5202 at Page 
1168, as Entry No. 3525030, in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder. 
5. On January 21,1999, Ada Craig conveyed her interest in the subject 
property to Carolyn Abbott also subject to a life estate by quit claim deed recorded 
January 28,1999, in Book 8241 at Page 2974 Entry No. 7237662 in the office of the Salt 
Lake County Recorder. The interest of Carolyn Abbott was subsequendy conveyed to the 
Plaintiff herein by quit claim deed dated May 20, 2002, and recorded June 3, 2002, in 
Book 8605 at Page 1545 as Entry No. 8251901 in the office of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder. 
6. Plaintiff is the owner of an undivided one-third interest in the subject 
property. 
7. Defendants are the owners as joint tenants of the remaining two-thirds 
interest in the subject property. 
8. Ada Craig is the parties' mother and is now deceased. 
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9. There are no liens or encumbrances appearing of record on the property, 
and Plaintiff has no knowledge of any parties who claim an interest in the property or 
who will be materially affected by this action other than these parties. 
10. Plaintiff has obtained a title report from Sutherland Tide Company, 
and such report is located at the offices of the attorney appearing hereon and may be 
used, inspected and copied by the parties to this action. 
11. During the last years of Ada Craigfs life, Plaintiff assisted her in the 
management of the property as rental units, using the proceeds therefrom to pay the 
expenses on the property and pay a portion of Ada Craig's care and support. 
12. Plaintiff and Defendants have been unable to agree on the operation 
or disposition of the property since some time prior to the death of Ada Craig, and in 
fact, as the result of the dispute between the parties, the property is now vacant. 
13. Plaintiff has approached the Defendants requesting that they either 
purchase his interest therein or consent to the sale of the property with a division of the 
proceeds between them. 
14. Defendants have refused Plaintiffs request and have refused to 
cooperate with Plaintiff in the management and care of the property. 
-3 -
15. Plaintiff has no objection to maintenance and necessary repairs to the 
premises to ready it for sale, but does not wish to become involved in or pay for exten-
sive or unnecessary work to the property. 
16. Defendants have undertaken an effort to deny Plaintiff a rightful 
interest in the tide to the subject property, including the filing of a false affidavit with 
the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office which asserts that Defendants are the sole tide 
holders to the property. 
17. Defendants have further caused the locks to be changed on the 
premises for the purpose of preventing Plaintiff from entering the premises and other-
wise asserting possession as an owner thereof. 
18. Without cause and without the approval or participation of Plaintiff, 
defendants caused a three-day notice to quit to be served upon the only tenant on the 
property, resulting in the vacating of said property by the tenant and loss of further 
income. 
19. Such effort on the part of Defendants to deny Plaintiff his interest in 
the tide to the subject property and rightful benefits as an owner thereof has been made 
by Defendants in bad faith with an intentional effort to deprive Plaintiff of a property 
interest legally and rightfully belonging to him as evidenced by valid conveyances on 
record with the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office. 
-4-
20. Such bad faith on the part of Defendants has necessitated the filing of 
this complaint by Plaintiff, and Plaintiff is entitled to relief under § 78-27-56, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended) including his costs, expenses and attorney fees incurred 
in bringing this action and in defending his rightful interests in the subject property. 
21. The dispute between the parties is ongoing and to undertake any 
control of the premises without the participation of the Plaintiff will further the dispute 
and antagonism between the parties. 
22. Due to the disruptive nature of the relationship between the parties, 
Plaintiff believes that the property is in danger of material damage, abuse or neglect 
unless a receiver is appointed to take and keep possession of the property, to receive the 
rents, to collect debts, and generally do such acts respecting the property as the court 
may authorize during the pendency of this litigation. 
23. In order to bring the dispute between the parties to an end, Plaintiff is 
informed and believes and alleges that a partition by sale of the property, rather than a 
physical division thereof, is more equitable to the parties in that although the property in 
question contains a number of rental units, it was originally constructed as a single 
family residence and the physical partition and apportionment and distribution of rents 
and expenses will be impossible. 
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24. In the event that Defendants persist in their efforts to assert sole 
control of the premises without Plaintiffs consent and participation, Tlaintiff requests 
that the court issue an injunction enjoining and restraining the Defendants from 
incurring further expenses on the property or taking income therefrom, if any, during the 
pendency of these proceedings. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests: 
1. That Defendants and each of them appear and answer this Complaint. 
2. The court decree partition of the above-described real property among 
the parties hereto according to their respective rights. 
3. The court decree that the real property be sold in its entirety pursuant 
to §78-39-1, etseq., Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), and a division of the net 
proceeds thereof among the parties hereto and according to their respective rights 
including the costs of the title report obtained by Plaintiff. 
4. The Defendants be restrained and enjoined from incurring any further 
expenses on the property or taking any income therefrom. 
5. A receiver be appointed by this court to oversee and manage the 
property during the pendency of this litigation in accordance with the requirements of R. 
66, Utah R. Civ. Pro. and that the costs and expenses of such receiver be paid by 
Defendants. 
-6 -
6. For reasonable attorneys1 fees incurred by the Plaintiff in the prosecu-
tion of this action by reason of the actions undertaken in bad faith by Defendants 
pursuant to § 78-27-56, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). 
7. For an order that the costs, disbursements and expenses of this action, 
including the costs of partition and sale, and the costs of the receiver, be paid by the 
Defendants and be made a lien upon their share of the proceeds of the sale of the real 
property. 
8. Plaintiff be granted such other and further relief as the court may deem 
just and equitable. 
DATED this Y~2~ day ofjdg&x, 2003. 
Plaintiffs address: 
4931 South Fairview Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
t^^  TON ANDERSON 
for Plaintiff 
-7-
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STATEMENT OF JlJRISDiC I ION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
*. . <i- -* />ri^  p n o ^ as the ™ r.44:^ 4br«l V N cu transferred (o llie Court of 
Appeals by the Ulan CHI; - iu' I 'milt. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OI REVIEW 
1. Whether the Trial Court correctly determined as a Finding of Fact that Ada 
R. Craig v she executed created both a joint tenancy interest 
and retained for herself a possessory life estate. The sta* review regarding 
findings of fact, is that the Utah Court of Appeals will not set aside the Trial Court"s 
liibliinr, unless ckails erroneoi is. Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177, 1184 (Utah 2004). 
2. Whether the Trial Court cornrIh <IVhi nniK-d lhal Ada K Craig maintained 
a possessory life estate until her death on July 11, 2003 and intended to retain da\ u'-day 
control over the property, thereby defeating Appellants' right to an accounting for profits 
of the property unhl her di-.ilh I IK •il.nul.ird ol'review regarding findings of fact, is that 
the Utah Court of Appeals will ilot set aside ttic ma ,; *ss clearly 
erroneous. Chen v. Stewart, 1"° p ^ H * ~~ 1 ! 84 <IJtah 2004). 
3. Whether the r] -discretion, properly appointed Robert D. 
Irvine as receiver of the proper*• ihe standard ol res \r\\ is llml llu appointment of a 
receiver or the refusal to appoint is in the sound discretion of the Trial Court and the Utah 
Court oi Appc.i : rot ov^Hurn on appeal unless the Trial Court abused its discretion. 
Skirvin v. Mestu, i4i i <-; >os, o/j ;0 th Cir. Ct. App I n Fnrt||CL iills determination 
is now moot and the Court in its discretion should summarily dismiss this issue on 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This was a case for partition of that real property which was the personal residence 
of Ada R. Craig for most of her life (the "Home"), which was tried before the Utah 
District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah, Judge Hansen presiding, on September 28-29, 
2004. The court issued its oral ruling on October 14, 2004, after having taken the matter 
under advisement. The Trial Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Order in favor of the Appellee [Plaintiff] on December 6, 2004, and appointed 
Appellee as Receiver to sell the Home. 
Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the court on November 10, 
2004, which was denied. Appellants filed with the Trial Court another post-trial Rule 
59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment on December 20, 2004, which was also 
denied. 
Appellants appealed from this final post-trial motion to the Utah Supreme Court. 
The appeal was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition pursuant to 
Section 78-2-2(4), Utah Code Annotated on February 15, 2005. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Ada R. Craig was the sole owner of her residence, real property located at 
251 East 1700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Home"), until January 18, 1981. (Trial 
Exhibit No.7, Ijl; Transcript Volume II, pp. 5-7). 
2. Ada R. Craig owned the Honu * and n: ;» d il a: ; in T p< Tsonal residence from 
approximately January 1973 i 11 itil 1 ler death on Jul) l l , 2003. During that ^ ' le, 
slii iiiJiniliiiiu'd lln, HOUR a] her sole expense. (Trial Exhibit No,7. 1j, , transcript 
Volume II. pp. 27-30). 
3. Appellant Colleen Erickson lived in the Home uiulri her' moilrf s r,nv and 
suppoi I lot 46 years, including a period of several years after she married and had a child. 
(Trial Exhibit No.7, ]\2) Appellant Sli.thm Nuderson liu-d wiili her mother in the Home 
for 43 years from 1954 to 1997. (Transcript p.3). 
4. On January 19, 1981, Ada R. Craig executed a Quit-Claim Deed regarding 
me IK . ... iguage, "ADA R CRAIG ... hereby QUIT-CLAIMS to 
ADA. R. CRAIG, SHARON V CRAIG and COLLEEN R. < K M< i as Joint Tenants with 
fiill rights of survivorship and not as tenants in commoii, reserving a hi** r^ for 
Al, " nVial Exhibit N- ] * <u--cm the "1981 Deed"). 
5. Ada R. Craig su-. Hi • i IK-I daughters [Appellants] that she 
executed the 1981 Deed because "At the time I signed 1 of 
n M-i \o e;u h of you. I vrr: concerned about Mark's [one of Ada's sons] wife causing 
some kind ui . -Inco m\ house itI jeopardy. Also at that time you 
were single and my other children were married , i " (Tri.t 
No.7,tl). 
6. St , , rson testified that she understood that her mother, Ada R. 
Craig, intended for her to im :,: vkadi and that she would 
not receive that inheritance until her mother passed away. (1 ran sen pi. p S I 
7. Colleen Erickson testified concerning the 1981 Deed that, "Shar[on] had a 
third and I had a third and my mom had a third, contingent upon the life estate of the 
property." (Transcript p. 69, line 9-10). 
8. In the latter part of 1998 it became necessary for Ada R. Craig to move 
from her Home for the purpose of receiving extended assistance and care in a local 
nursing care facility. (Transcript Volume II, pp. 13-14). 
9. In 1999, Ada R. Craig gave her eldest son, Robert D. Irvine, powers of 
attorney by signing a Durable Power of Attorney for the purpose of helping her manage 
the Home and assist her with her move into the Highland Care Center at the approximate 
cost of $5200 or $5300 per month. (Trial Exhibit No.8; Transcript Volume II, pp 20-22). 
10. At the time Ada R. Craig moved into the Highland Care Center, the only 
substantial asset available to her to help pay for her care and other expenses was her 
Home. (Transcript Volume II, p. 27). 
11. At the time Ada R. Craig moved into Highland Care Center, Appellants 
Sharon Anderson and Colleen Erickson refused to consent to the sale of their mother's 
house or her one-third joint tenancy interest, to pay for her care and other needs. 
(Transcript Volume II, pp. 31-35). 
12. At the time Ada R. Craig moved into the Highland Care Center, Appellee 
and his wife provided their own personal financial assistance for the payment of the 
Highland Care Center monthly costs and other needs of Ada R. Craig and paid 
approximately $175,000 over the course of 3-4 years for Ada's care. (Transcript Volume 
II, p. 26). 
13, On or about January 21, 1999, Ada i\. ciuig, w ' '«. •»-•..*-•. ;—r 
attorney, quit-claimed her remaining one-third joint tenancy interest to another daughter, 
Carolyn =^ JL . ia •-.- : k estate, (January 21, 1999 Deed). (Trial 
Exhibit No.2, Transcript \ uiainc ii, pp. 35-37, :M, 5 J ) 
1
 < The January 2 K 1999 deed stated "ADA R. CRAIG also known as RAH S. 
Ci ^ . . i - CAROLYN ABBOTT grantee the following 
described tract oi land, ic^ei. u.. *e estate " ( I rial Exhibit No.2; 
Transcript Volume II pp 35-37, 51, 53). 
15. On February 2, 1999, Ada R. Craig sent a lettei lo her daughters (the 
Appellants) stating i. > x riting a letter to one of 
my children pleading for what already belongs to me. 1 now ii I H nccessai lo\\nteto 
two of my children who have taken the position that the Home that I have owned for over 
fifty years m I «n !x -lones to me ... It was never my intention that each of you receive 
one third of my Home until my death ai. \\ as wr tien the 
funds from the sale of my Home are no longer needed in my behali, it is n: :• t 
} receive your share of those funds as was intended when I HP claimed the Home 
to the three of us." (Trial Exhibit No. /. lunsnipi ' .Hiuih il 
16. Oi i or about. May 20, 2002, Carolyi \ Abbott conveyed i inh'tvsf in ili«" 
Home io Appellee, Robert D Irvine, for the purpose of furthering efforts to sell Ada's 
Home or at - •< rein and because Appellee had paid nearly all of 
Ada's nursing Home expenses. (Trial Exhibit No.3; Iraiviaipi \>liiiiti" II. pp. W-38). 
17. Using his Power-of-Attorney, from approximately January 21, 1999 until 
his mother's death, Robert D. Irvine, at the direction of his mother, was able to rent the 
Home and use the modest net rental income to help provide for his mother's care. 
(Transcript Volume II, pp. 18-22, 26-27, 34). 
18. Ada R. Craig passed away on July 11, 2003. 
19. Immediately following the death of Ada R. Craig, Appellants claimed sole 
right and possession to the Home and excluded Appellee from the Home. Finally, 
Appellee brought this action to realize his rightful one-third interest in the Property, 
(Complaint, pp.4-6). 
20. Robert D. Irvine had substantial experience in buying and selling real 
property and in managing real property and was a logical choice for appointment as a 
receiver. 
21. Mr. Irvine was able to quickly accomplish a sale of the Home and at the 
hearing for approval of the sale, Appellants instead purchased the one-third interest of 
Mr. Irvine. (See Motion for Court Approval of Real Property p. 2). 
22. The Trial Court, based on testimony of the parties and exhibits at trial, 
made Findings of Fact as follows: 
1. There were two main issues presented at trial by the parties to the Court. 
First, what interest, if any, did Ada R. Craig ("Craig") have in the real 
property after executing the January 19, 1981 deed; and second, if Craig 
owned a joint tenancy interest in the real property following the execution 
of the January 19, 1981 deed, was she competent to transfer her interest in 
the property to her other daughter, Carolyn Abbott. 
2. Based upon the strict application of the words of the deed, the Court 
finds that Ada R. Craig conveyed to herself and to her daughters Sharon 
Craig Anderson and Colleen Craig Erickson the property in joint tenancy, 
with i ull rights oi survivorship, and in addition to her one-tl lit d joii it 
tenancy interest, Craig also granted to herself a life estate iti tlle ie it 
property. 
3. IIie Court also finds that Ada Craig intended to grant un[to] herself and 
to her daughters a joint tenancy interest in the property, and [in] addition to 
her one-third joint tenancy interest, Craig also intended to grant to herself a 
life estate in the real property. 
4. there was not any believable or persuasive evidence that Ada Craig 
intended to abandon control of the day to day operations or control of the 
property while Ada was alive. The evidence suggests that she intended to 
retain control o\ er the proper!} . 
5. Following the execution of the 1981 Deed, Ada Craig, Sharon Anderson 
and Colleen Erickson shared a one-third interest in the totality '>f the 
property as joint tenants, with rights of survivorship. 
6. Ada Craig retained a joint tenancy interest so that it one or both oi her 
daughters predeceased her, a share or all of the property would return to 
Craig, and not go to another family member of the co-owner daughters. She 
was interested in giving the property to 1ter daughters if she died, bii1 was 
not interested in giving the proper!) u one ^f her daughters' heirs i! \ 
daughter predeceased her. She therefore intended w* main a joint tenancy 
interest in the property. 
7. The life estate Craig retameu in auuiuon lo ner joint tenancy interest was 
also retained for another important purpose: By creating a life estate only 
for herself, Ada intended to retain day-to-day control of the property. The 
'reserving a life estate only" language in the 1981 deed was it itended to 
reserve the life estate only in the name of Ada, and i lot : ; the name of her 
daughters, which excludes her two daughters from contra ^rthe property 
while Ada Craig was alive. 
8. The evidence shows that Ada Craig said she owned the property 
following the 1981 deed, and also that Colleen Erickson testified that this 
was a l/3rd, l/3rd, l/3rd ownership relationship between Ada, Colleen 
Erickson, and Sharon Anderson. Other witnesses who testified for plaintiff 
supported this interpretation of Ada Craig's ownership intent. 
9. Whether one looks to Ada's intent, or looking at the actual language of 
the 1981 deed, the result is the same, as specified above. (Findings of Fact. 
PP. 2-3). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1.- The Trial Coi irt correctly found that the 1981 Deed created both, a 
possessory life esU»* •eipreting a 
deed, the intent of the grantor prevails. Khalsa v. Ward, 101 P.3d 843, 845 (Ut. Ct. App. 
2004). The primary rule of construction for a deed is that the intent of the grantor should 
be determined and carried out. 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds § 193 (2005). The Trial Court 
determined, as a Finding of Fact that Ada R. Craig intended to grant a joint tenancy 
interest to herself, Sharon Anderson and Colleen Erickson, each with 1/3 interests in the 
Home for the purpose of giving the Home to them if she passed away. (See Findings of 
Fact fflf 2-7). In addition, the Trial Court found that Ada R. Craig intended to retain a life 
estate so that she could maintain the day-to-day control and use of the Home for her 
lifetime. (See Findings of Fact Tftf 2-7). Therefore, unless Appellants demonstrate clear 
error by the Trial Court, this Court should uphold the Trial Court. Courts have 
determined that a life estate and a tenancy in common are not inconsistent estates and can 
be held in the same person at the same point in time. See United States v. Gibbons, 71 
F.3d 1496, 1500 (10th Cir. Ct. App. 1995). Therefore, the Trial Court's findings should 
stand. 
2. The Trial Court correctly determined that the Appellants are not entitled to 
an accounting for rents and expenses of the Home through the period of time that Ada R. 
Craig was still alive and in need of the meager rental income which helped contribute to 
her living needs. The Trial Court determined, as a matter of fact, that Ada R. Craig's 
intent was to maintain the day-to-day control of the Home while alive, thereby excluding 
her two daughters from control of the Home while she was living. (See Findings of Fact f 
7). The Trial Court further determined that Ada R. Craig's intent in 1981 was that her 
daughters receive the Home upon her death, but not prior. (See Findings of Fact *[  6). 
Based on the facts and the language of the 1981 Deed and the January 21, 1999 deed, the 
Trial Court correctly determined that Ada R. Craig had properly retained a life estate. 
(Conclusions of Law, p. 2). Therefore, unless the Appellants demonstrate clear error and 
the Court determines that the Trial Court incorrectly determined the law, the Court should 
uphold the Trial Court's findings. Moreover, the possessor of a life estate is entitled to 
all of the property's rents and profits. See Hammond v. McArthur, 183 P.2d 1 (CA. 1947) 
(Wherein one joint tenant conveyed to the other a life estate in the property with the right 
to all of its rents and profits - the court held that the granting of the life estate did not 
terminate the joint tenancy insofar as the right of survivorship was concerned). 
3. The Trial Court acted properly within its discretion to appoint Robert D. 
Irvine as receiver of the Home under its close supervision. Mr. Irvine had substantial 
experience with real estate and was credible and trustworthy. Mr. Irvine's instruction 
from the Trial Court was to sell the property under the close scrutiny of the Trial Court. 
Mr. Irvine procured a sale, but Appellants preempted the sale when on the eve of court 
approval of the sale, Appellants instead offered to purchase the 1/3 interest of Mr. Irvine. 
The purchase of the one-third interest of Mr. Irvine by Appellants has rendered the issue 
moot. 
4. Appelle prevailed at trial and on all post-trial motions. Appellee is entitled 
to his costs of appeal in accordance with Rule 34(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure and upon presentation of a bill of costs. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
THE 1981 DEED CREATED A POSSESSORY LIFE 
ESTATE AND A JOINT TENANCY INTEREST IN THE 
GRANTOR CONSISTENT WITH THE GRANTOR'S 
INTENT. 
A. The Standard of Review for Findings of Fact is Clear Error. 
Although the Trial Court made Findings of Fact, Appellants have made no 
reference to set those aside, have marshaled no evidence in opposition, and have relied 
solely on their technical legal argument. Not surprisingly, the Trial Court found against 
Appellants on every factual issue presented. 
Appellants have stated to this Court that the standard of review is merely the 
standard of "correctness". Appellants have flatly ignored the Findings of Fact which 
supported the Trial Court's Conclusions of Law. The issues raised by Appellants are 
mixed issues of fact and law. For such issues, the Court must divide its deliberations 
between legal issues and fact issues. The correct standard for overturning a Trial Court's 
findings of fact is "clearly erroneous". In short, the Court would have to find that the 
Trial Court so clearly misconstrued the facts that it was clearly erroneous. This Court 
normally gives deference to the Trial Court which has seen and heard the witnesses and 
their testimony. 
"To successfully challenge an ultimate finding of fact, 'an [A]ppellant must first 
marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence 
is legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most 
favorable to the court below.'?t Parduhn v. Bennett, 112 P.3d 495 (Utah 2005) (quoting 
Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177, 1184 (Utah 2004). A Trial Court's findings of fact will 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Chen 100 P.3d at 1184. A Trial Court's 
conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. Khalsa v. Ward, 101 P.3d 843, 845 (Ut. 
Ct. App. 2004) (citing Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. Dist, 63 P.3d 705, 709 (Utah 2002)). 
The burden is on Appellants to present and overturn the Trial Court's Findings of 
Fact. Concerning the Clear Error standard, the Supreme Court has said, "We have no 
business disturbing the District Court's ruling 'simply because we would have decided 
the case differently,' but only if based 'on the entire evidence, [we are] left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'" Georgia v. Ashcroft, 
539 U.S. 461, 463 (2003). 
Ultimately, since Appellants have made no attempt to marshal evidence to 
overturn the Findings of Fact, this Court must necessarily accept those Findings as 
determined by the Trial Court. The judgment in favor of Appellee must stand. 
B. When Interpreting a Deed, the Intent of the Grantor Must Govern. 
Out of care and concern for her daughters, who were single and still residing at 
home, in 1981, Ada R. Craig made arrangements to provide them with some security 
when she passed away. She did so by executing a deed to them as joint tenants with her, 
each of them owning a 1/3 interest. By reserving to herself a life estate, she intended to 
maintain the use and control of the Home during her life. Her care and concern for her 
daughters was not rewarded in kind when she really needed help. 
The Trial Court correctly applied long-standing rules of construction to the 1981 
Deed when it gave the deed meaning consistent with the express language of the deed 
and with Ada R. Craig's intent. This Court has said that while interpreting a deed, the 
intention of the parties, drawn from the whole deed must govern. Khalsa v. Ward, 101 
P.3d 843, 845 (Ut. Ct. App. 2004). In construing a deed, a court will determine intent 
from the four corners of the document and look to parol evidence if ambiguous. RHN 
Corp. v. Veibell, 96 P.3d 935, 945 (Utah 2004). Utah courts will interpret deeds in the 
same manner as contracts. Holladay Duplex Management Co., L.L.C v. Howells, 47 P.3d 
104, 105 (Ut. Ct. App. 2002). 
The Trial Court determined in its Findings of Fact that Ada R. Craig intended to 
grant unto herself and to her daughters, Sharon Craig and Colleen Erickson,a 1/3 joint 
tenancy interest in the Home. (See Findings of Fact p. 2 ^ 2-3). In addition, the court 
found that Ada intended to retain a life estate in the Home. (See Findings of Fact p. 2 j^ 
3). Ada R. Craig did this with the intent to retain the day-to-day control over the Home 
during her lifetime, and furthermore, to give the Home to her daughters when she died, 
but not prior. (See Findings of Fact p. 3 *[flf 6-7). 
These findings are consistent with Ada R. Craig's actions. Ada intended to retain a 
possessory interest and from 1981 until 1999 continued to live in, maintain, remodel, and 
improve the residence. (Transcript Volume II, pp. 9-14). Thereafter, she appealed to her 
co-owner daughters to sell the Home so she would have her 1/3 share to use toward her 
living and care expenses. (Trial Exhibit No.7 ^j 2-3). The daughters refused so she 
appointed her eldest son, Robert D. Irvine as her agent to rent the Home and use the rents 
to assist with her abundant health care costs at the Highland Care Center. (Trial Exhibit 
No.8; Transcript Volume II, pp. 18-20). Ada R. Craig was competent and understood her 
needs and desires. (Findings of Fact, p 4, ^[11-13). 
By construing the 1981 Deed according to its plain language and consistent with 
Ada R. Craig's intent, the Trial Court acted in accordance with long-standing rules of 
deed construction. As stated in paragraph A above, it is the responsibility of Appellants to 
attack the evidence and Appellants have made no effort to rebut the conclusions of the 
Trial Court. 
Interpreting the 1981 Deed otherwise, would work against the manifest best 
interests of Ada R. Craig and would produce unjust results. Ada's undeniable interest 
was that her only substantial asset, her Home, would be preserved as her residence for 
life, or an income for life. The 1981 Deed also assured her and her daughters that they or 
she (Ada) would receive the fee interest at the death of the last survivor while the joint 
tenancy existed. Even the Appellants' testimony corroborates Ada Craig's intent with 
regard to the property. Colleen Erickson testified concerning the 1981 Deed that, 
uShar[on] had a third and I had a third and my mom had a third, contingent upon the life 
estate of the property." (Transcript, p. 69, line 9-10). 
As it turned out, Ada's retention of a one-third interest was also the only way to 
provide assistance for her living and care costs. Accordingly, the intent of Ada R. Craig 
was—and therefore the Trial Court's determination was—that Ada R. Craig granted to 
herself a joint tenancy interest as well as a life estate. The Trial Court was correct as a 
matter of law, and there was ample support for its factual findings. 
C Ada R. Craig's Joint Tenancy Interest and Life Estate are Distinct and Separate 
Legally Consistent Property Interests. 
No one disputes that Ada R. Craig could convey the Home to herself and her 
daughters as joint tenants with right of survivorship. No one disputes that Ada R. Craig 
could convey the Home to her daughters and retain for herself a life estate. Appellants 
argue that she cannot do both at the same time. Appellee did not agree and neither did 
the Trial Court. 
Without citing case law, Appellants argue that a merger occurs when a greater and 
lesser interest in real property are conveyed or retained. However, where the intent of a 
grantor is clear, courts have had no difficulty in allowing the two interests to be given full 
effect. 
Courts have held that a life estate and a tenancy in common are not inconsistent 
estates and can be held in the same person at the same point in time. See United States v. 
Gibbons, 71 F.3d 1496, 1500 (10th Cir. Ct. App. 1995). See also Cole v Cole, 294 P.2d 
494, 495 (Ca. Ct. App. 1956); Hammond v. McArthur, 183 P.2d 1 (CA. 1947). In 
Hammond, Rowley, a widow, and McArthur, an unmarried woman, acquired certain real 
property as joint tenants. Id. Later, McArthur conveyed to Rowley a life estate in the 
property by deed. Id. Hammond, Rowley's successor, claimed that the conveyance of the 
possessory interest extinguished the joint fee ownership and survivorship rights, claiming 
the rights were inconsistent. Id. McArthur argued that the grant of the life estate did not 
convey to Rowley anything that she did not already possess and that the life estate was 
not repugnant to the rights of survivorship. Id at 3-4. 
The court found for McArthur and held that when one of two joint tenants in fee 
simple makes a conveyance of his or her interest for life, upon the termination of the life 
interest, the joint tenancy, as it originally existed, revives. Id at 8. 
This is consistent with the finding in United States v. Gibbons. In,that-case, a 
husband and wife owned a Home as joint tenants. Id. The divorce decree awarded the 
wife a conditional right to live on the property during her lifetime. Id. The court held that 
the wife held a life estate, or possessory interest, in the whole of the property and a 
remainder interest, or tenancy in common interest, of one-half in the property. Id at 1499. 
Although the separation agreement severed the joint tenancy, the wife still maintained a 
simultaneous possessory and remainder interest via a life estate and tenancy in common 
estate in the Home. Id. 
The case at hand is similar. Ada R. Craig intended to grant to herself and to two of 
her daughters a 1/3 fee interest each in joint tenancy with full right of survivorship. Ada 
R. Craig also intended to retain a life estate in order that she could maintain the day-to-
day control, possession and enjoyment of the Home until her death. Appellant, Sharon 
Anderson, understood that this meant she would not receive her interest in the Home until 
her mother passed away. (Transcript p 5, lines 5-10). Colleen Erickson clearly 
understood that her mother owned a one-third interest in the Home. The two estates in 
Ada R. Craig are not incompatible but are legally sustained and are consistent with her 
intent as determined by the Trial Court. Therefore the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law by the Trial Court must stand. 
D. Appellants Misstate the Holding of Robinson v. King, the Sole Authority 
Supporting Their Position. 
The Appellants would have the Court use antiquated technicalities to override the 
intent of Ada R. Craig even though misapplied and misconstrued. The bedrock of their 
position (that a habendum clause granting a life estate which accompanies a granting 
clause conveying a fee simple interest in real estate must then limit the grantee's interest 
to a life estate only and no fee interest) is based on a single North Carolina case, 
Robinson v. King. However, Appellants have misunderstood and misstated the holding 
of that case. 
The court in Robinson relied on a previous North Carolina case, Triplets when it 
said: 
[T]his doctrine, which regarded the granting clause and the 
habendum and tenendum as separate and independent portions of the 
same instrument, each with its especial function, is becoming 
obsolete in this country, and a more liberal and enlightened rule of 
construction obtains, which looks at the whole instrument without 
reference to formal divisions, in order to ascertain the intention of 
the parties, and does not permit antiquated technicalities to override 
the plainly expressed intention of the grantor...." 
Robinson v. King 314 S.E.2d 768, 772 (N.C. App. 1984) (emphasis added). 
The court further stated, "For forty years after Triplett the North Carolina Supreme 
Court consistently construed deeds according to the overall intent expressed in the 
instrument." Id at 773. The court then concluded that: 
The surrounding circumstances and evidence apart from the 
quitclaim deed are ambiguous at best, and fail to show a clear intent 
on the part of the grantors to convey a fee simple. 
Id at 775 (emphasis added). 
The court clearly based its holding on a determination of the intent of the grantor 
after reviewing the deed itself, the Last Will and Testament of the decedent and other 
surrounding circumstances. Id at 774. As the holding states at page 775, there was no 
clear intent to grant a fee simple. Id at 775. The court used modern rules of deed 
construction to ascertain the intent of the grantor and did not use antiquated technicalities 
to interpret the deed as Appellants are urging the court to do in the case at hand. 
Appellants also rely on the definition of "Habendum Clause" in the Black's Law 
Dictionary 5th edition to support their position and have quoted this portion in their brief: 
A habendum clause is the clause usually following the granting part of the 
premises of a deed, which defines the extent of the ownership in the thing 
granted to be held and enjoyed by the grantee. The office of 'habendum' is 
properly to determine what estate or interest is granted by the deed, though 
office may be performed by the premises, in which case the habendum may 
lessen, enlarge, explain, or qualify, but not totally contradict or be 
repugnant to, the estate granted in the premises. 
Black's Law Dictionary 5 Edition, page 639 (Appellants' brief page 12) 
(emphasis added). 
A habendum clause is traditionally the "To have and to hold" clause. The granting 
clause in the 1981 Deed which states, "Ada R. Craig, grantor of Salt Lake City, County 
of Salt Lake, State of Utah, hereby Quit-Claims to Ada R. Craig, Sharon V. Craig and 
Colleen R. Craig as Joint Tenants with full rights of survivorship and not as tenants in 
common . . ." grants to Ada R. Craig, and two of her daughters, Sharon Anderson and 
Colleen Erickson, each a 1/3 joint tenancy with full rights of survivorship. As the Black's 
Law definition states, the language afterward, or habendum clause as Appellants label it, 
can lessen, enlarge, explain or qualify but not totally contradict or be repugnant to, the 
estate granted in the premises. It would be absurd for Ada R. Craig to grant unto herself a 
1/3 joint tenancy interest with full right of survivorship only to take it away directly 
afterward. 
The explanation brought forth by Appellants defies all reason and common sense. 
Furthermore, the Appellants' explanation results in a habendum clause that is 
contradictory or repugnant to the premise or granting clause. The dictionary defines 
repugnant as inconsistent or incompatible. (See Merriam Webster's Online Dictionary). 
To grant a joint tenancy interest and thereafter, take it away only to supplant it with 
something less is clearly inconsistent, contradictory and illogical. Moreover, this would 
be in opposition to the function of a habendum clause, and therefore cannot possibly 
define the intent of the grantor and therefore the 1981 Deed. 
In order to be consistent with the Black's Law definition brought forth by 
Appellants, the habendum clause after the premise or granting clause might say 
something to limit, qualify, or expand the grant. Examples might be "with right to all 
rents" or "with right to exclude all other owners" or "with no alcohol on the premises" in 
order to properly coincide with the Black's Law definition. These are examples of 
language that serve to lessen, enlarge, explain or qualify but not contradict or be 
repugnant to the premise. 
The language immediately following the premise or granting clause in the 1981 
Deed states, "Preserving a Life Estate only for Ada R. Craig." (emphasis added). This 
language, if it is a habendum clause, is clearly contradictory and repugnant to the 
granting language. Therefore, the language functions not as a habendum clause, but as a 
reservation of a life estate in the grantor. If it is a habendum clause, the fact that it 
contradicts logic and the premise itself works contrary to the proper function of a 
habendum clause. As such, it is more likely that the language results in a granting clause 
followed by a reservation if antiquated technicalities are to serve our purposes for deed 
construction. 
Based on the foregoing, the court should look at the intent of the grantor in 
construing the 1981 Deed. Appellants must therefore bring forth enough evidence to 
show clear error by the Trial Court in determining the intent of Ada R. Craig before the 
Trial Court's Findings of Fact can be set aside. To put it bluntly, Appellants have no 
legal authority to support their position and no credible factual evidence to dispute the 
findings of the Trial Court. The Trial Court's findings must stand. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
THE APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO AN 
ACCOUNTING FOR PROFITS AND EXPENSES OF THE 
PROPERTY THROUGH THE PERIOD OF TIME THAT 
ADA R. CRAIG WAS STILL ALIVE. 
Ada R. Craig's nursing Home costs exceeded $5,000.00 per month. Amazingly, 
while not contributing anything to the costs of their mother's care and having received a 
magnanimous gift of two-thirds ownership in the Home, Appellants would now have the 
Court take back the meager rental income Ada received and used to partially fund her 
care. 
Ada R. Craig, at all times, retained a life estate in her Home. Appellants argue 
once again that the Court should ignore her obvious intent and eliminate her life estate as 
a result of the 1999 deed to Carolyn Abbott. Once again, Appellants argue without legal 
authority and in the face of overwhelming law in favor of Appellee. 
During the continuance of a life estate in real property the life tenant is entitled to 
the possession, control, and enjoyment of the property. 31 C.J.S. Estates § 36 (2005). 
The courts will presume a merger only if equity demands it. Miller v. Martineau & 
Co., 983 P.2d 1107, 1113 (Ut. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Federal Land Bank v. Colorado 
Nat'lBank, 786 P.2d 514, 515 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) ("'Equity does not favor the doctrine 
of merger . . . .'").1 
Appellants claim that they are entitled to an accounting of profits and expenses 
because Ada R. Craig conveyed all of her interest in the Home to Carolyn Abbott in the 
1999 deed. In the eyes of Appellants, the life estate and the joint tenancy interest merged 
in Carolyn Abbott contrary to the express language and intent of the deed. As a result, 
they argue that Appellants' interests in the property became present interests on the date 
of the 1999 deed if not before. (See Brief of Appellant pg 17 1f 1-2). 
The Quit-Claim Deed dated January 21, 1999 contains the following language, 
"ADA R. CRAIG also known as RAE S. CRAIG ... grantor hereby QUIT-CLAIM[s] to 
CAROLYN ABBOTT grantee the following described tract of land... Reserving to the 
Grantor a life estate" (Trial Exhibit No.2) (emphasis added). 
1
 See alsoMontgomery v. Browder, 930 S.W.2d 772, 781 (Tx. Ct. App. 1996) (Holding that the doctrine of merger of 
estates is not favored, and does not apply where it is the intention of the parties that it should not apply and when it 
is in the interest of the holder of the two estates to keep them separate); Western Bank of Las Cruces v. Malooly, 895 
P.2d 265, 270 (NM. Ct. App. 1995) (Courts will not compel a merger of estates where the party in whom the two 
interests are vested does not intend such a merger to take place, or where it would be inimical to the interest of the 
party in whom the several estates have united). 
The possessory life estate and joint tenancy interests of Ada R. Craig could not 
have merged in Carolyn Abbot because the deed clearly reserves the life estate to Ada. 
Ada R. Craig retained her possessory life estate interest until she passed away in 2003. 
With her possessory life estate interest, Ada R. Craig retained her right to, "[Possession, 
control, and enjoyment of the property" throughout her lifetime. 31 C.J.S. Estates § 36 
(2005). At no time did Carolyn Abbott, or later Robert D. Irvine, claim ownership or use 
of income derived from rental of the Home. At all times, the rents were used solely for 
the benefit of Ada R. Craig. 
Even if technical rules required that the life estate interest and the joint tenancy 
interest united in Carolyn Abbott, a merger would be contrary to the best interests of the 
grantor because Ada R. Craig needed and attempted to utilize her ownership in the 
property to pay for her health care expenses. Therefore, equity would dictate that no 
merger took place. 
A further technical defect in the argument of Appellants is the dates of ownership 
of Appellee, Robert D. Irvine. Appellants have asked for an accounting form January 21, 
199 through July 11, 2003. Mr. Irvine received a conveyance from his sister, Caroline 
Abbott on May 20, 2002. Thus, prior to that date, he had no ownership rights or control, 
except acting as an agent for Ada R. Craig. If Appellants' arguments were accepted, Mr. 
Irvine, at worst, would owe to Appellants an accounting from May 20, 2002 until July 11, 
2003, when Appellants immediately excluded him from the Home. 
However, we need not pursue this line of thinking further because the plain 
language of the deed clearly reserves a life estate in the grantor, thereby resulting in a 
conveyance of the joint tenancy interest only to Carolyn Abbott. The Trial Court clearly 
determined the intent of Ada R. Craig with regard to the 1999 deed (a factual 
determination). Appellants have offered nothing to overturn the Findings of the Trial 
Court. As a result, Appellants' request for an accounting of income and expenses of the 
property fails and the holding of the Trial Court must stand. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN APPOINTING ROBERT D. IRVINE AS RECEIVER 
FOR THE SALE OF THE HOME. 
Appellants suffered no harm or prejudice, but they still want to dispute the 
appointment of Mr. Irvine as receiver. However, the Trial Court properly applied its 
discretion when it appointed Appellee as receiver of the property under its direct 
supervision. Mr. Irvine has spent his career buying, selling, managing, and developing 
real property. The sale of a Home under the supervision of the Trial Court seems a 
reasonable task for Mr. Irvine. 
The court bases its authority to appoint a receiver on its inherent equitable power. 
Interlake Co. v. Von Hake, 697 P.2d 238, 239 (Utah 1985) (A receivership is an equitable 
matter and is entirely within the control of the court.) (citing Shaw v. Robison, 537 P.2d 
487, 490 (Utah 1975)). 
"In determining whether to continue a receivership or discharge the receiver the 
court will consider the rights and interests of all parties concerned . . . ." Shaw 537 P.2d 
at 490. A receiver is an officer of the court acting under its direct supervision. Interlake 
Co. 697 P.2d at 240. Therefore, a receiver has limited power and must seek advice from 
the courts. Id. 
The appointment of a receiver or the refusal to appoint is in the sound discretion of 
the Trial Court and will not be overturned on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is 
shown. Skirvin v. Mesta, 141 F.2d 668, 673 (10th Cir. Ct. App. 1944). See also Milwaukee 
& M.R. Co. v. Soutter, 154 U.S. 540, 541 (1864); Lee v. Farmers Co-Op. Ass'n of 
Mountain View, 113 P.2d391, 393 (OK. 1941). 
Mr. Irvine was familiar with the property and had managed the property for his 
mother, Ada R. Craig. In addition, Mr. Irvine has vast experience managing property. 
Therefore, Mr. Irvine was the person most able to meet the requirements of a receiver 
under the circumstances. The Trial Court justifiably determined that he was qualified and 
limited his authority to arranging a sale. When Mr. Irvine brought a final sale 
arrangement to the court for approval, Appellants instead asked the court if they could 
jointly purchase the 1/3 interest of Mr. Irvine at the offered price and the Trial Court 
granted their request. 
The Trial Court adequately protected the interests of all parties through its close 
supervision and Mr. Irvine effected a sale. Appellants were unable to demonstrate harm 
or prejudice at trial, and have suffered no harm. They have neither alleged nor shown 
harm to this Court. If there is no harm, then what is the complaint? It may be 
appropriate for this Court to adopt an adage sometimes utilized in athletics, i.e. "No 
Harm - No Foul." Regardless of whether the Trial Court was right or wrong (and 
Appellee does not concede that it was wrong), it is a moot point. The Trial Court gave 
the order, the receiver fulfilled his duty and Appellants now are the fee owners of the 
property. The Court should therefore summarily dismiss this claim. 
IV. APPELLEE PREVAILED AT TRIAL AND IS ENTITLED 
TO RECEIVE FROM APPELLANTS HIS COSTS 
Rule 34(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that upon affirming an 
order or award, the Appellee should be awarded his costs. Appellee has incurred costs 
and expenses which are the subject of this Rule. The Court should award Appellee his 
costs of appeal upon presentation of such costs. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court correctly determined that a deed executed in 1981 created both a 
joint tenancy interest and a possessory life estate Home of the grantor, Ada R. Craig, 
consistent with her intent. The Trial Court determined within its Findings of Fact that 
Ada R. Craig intended to retain both interests in the Home. Long established rules of 
deed construction require that a grantor's intent prevail over antiquated technicalities and 
arbitrary rules of construction. Therefore, a court should not set aside the Trial Court's 
findings unless clearly erroneous, thereby preserving the grantor's intent. Appellants 
have not shown clear error. 
The Trial Court correctly determined that the Appellants are not entitled to an 
accounting of profits and expenses for the period of time Ada R. Craig was still alive. 
The plain language of the 1999 deed clearly granted to Carolyn Abbott the joint tenancy 
interest while reserving a life estate in Ada R. Craig. The Trial Court found that this was 
also consistent with Ada R. Craig's intent to retain the day-to-day control of the property 
until she passed away. Therefore, as the holder of a possessory life estate, Ada R. Craig 
was entitled to the benefit of possession, enjoyment and rental income from the Home to 
supplement her abundant health care costs until she passed away. 
The Trial Court acted properly within its discretion when it appointed Appellee as 
receiver for the Home. Mr. Irvine was familiar with the Home because he managed it for 
his mother while she received care at Highland Care Center. He had substantial 
experience buying, selling, and maintaining real property. In addition, the Trial Court 
closely supervised every action. Furthermore, Appellants have failed to show any harm. 
However, the issue is moot because the Appellants have purchased the interests of Mr. 
Irvine and are now owners of the Home. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the holdings of the Trial Court must stand and 
Appellee should receive an award of his costs on appeal. 
Dated this / ^ d a y of October, 2005. 
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( ) Facsimile 
^ Hand Delivery 
( ) Overnight courier 
Tnis M. Astill 
Attorney for Appellee and Plaintiff 
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at . M Fee Paid $-
by Dep. Book Page. 
Mail tax notice to_ - Address 
-0 0 
De .  Rcf: 2^L 




ADA R. CRAIG, 
grantor 
of SALT LAKE CITY > County of SALT LAKE » State of Utah, hereby 
QUrr-CLAIMs t a 
ADA I U CRAIG,~SHARON V . CRAIG a n d COLLEEN R. CRAIG a s J o i n t T e n a n t s | ' 
w i t h f u l l r i g h t s o f s u r v i v o r s h i p and n o t a s t e n a n t s i n common
 r 1 i 
r e s e r v i n g a L i f e E s t a t e o n l y f o r ADA R. CRAIG f ' 
- *'?£*** ^ -«§a*v«r-!j5^ v rJ~*j- .. $ - grantees - ! 
of SALT LAKE C I T T r COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH for the sum of 
V
~TEN DOLLARS AND NOAOQ "DOLLARS, 
j and o t h e r g o o d a n d v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
J the following described tract * of land in S a l t L a k e County, 
L Sute of Utah: [
 f 
K Commencing 272*25 feet West from Southeast Corner Lot 1, Block 12 
xj 5 Acre Plat "A," A Big Field Survey West 66 feet North 170.1 feet 
East £6 feet South 170.1 feet to beginning. 
c W _ «*s? . . .§ 
\ 
Hil £ is? 
VrnjTESS the hand of said grantor , this ' ' day of 
, A. D. one thousand nine hundred and E i g h t y - o n e 
\ I Signed in the presence of ]Xi—QJ^MC^ 7 l C * W t 
ADA R . CRAIG ^ 
STATE OF UTAHr 
COUNTT OF SALT LAKE 
^'^^/S^ day of V ^ ^ ^ f ^
 rAJ).19 81 g 
persondfly'applare&before mc ^ 6 / g 
/ * ^ . . V f \ ' A , ADA R. CRAIG Cn 
the signer **<rf^ihe?wthin instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that 4 e executed the o 
\ 0 ; 
:
~j:1 ^~u^4 
U Q U . r / * / «/f (/ A V, Notary Public 
My commig3rQrt>>expirf« ' / / * I 07 Residing in \^A^Cc^^c ^ - ^ IAJ^XJ-— 
/ t>P°0VED FORM - UTAH SECURITIES COMMISSION 
FORM 103—QUITCLAIM OCCO—«*« "»«w MNTMMUTM «a_C_ UTA* 
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Recorded at Request ofL 
at . M. Fee Paid $_ 
V 
Mail tax notice to_ 
. Dep. Book- Page. .Ref.:_ 
/ A2?/7/,*/. Address_ 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
ADA R. CRAIG also known as RAE S» CRAIG 




SALT LAKE CUT, UTAH 
TEN AMD NO/100-
grantor 
, State of Utah, hereby 
grantee 
for the sum of 
. DOLLARS, 
and other good and valuable considerat ion 
the following described tract of land in 
State of Utah: 
Commencing 272.25 feet West from Southeast Corner Lot,.I, Block 12, 
5 Acre Plat "A", A Big Field Survey; West 66 feet; North 170.1 feet; 
East 66 feet; South 170.1 feet to begijcuiing. 
Reserving to the Grantor a life estate-
County, J 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor , this 
, A - D . 
Signed in the presence of 
day of | • 
sX&rtf' &J3^r 
I Ada. R. Craig 
STATE OP UTAH, 
County of Sal t Lake 
On the £ / *£ day of Jl^f^^^^ S?9 9 A. D. 
personally appeared^efore me 
Ada R. Craig a l so knovn as RAE S. CRAIG 
I 
the signer of the foregoing instpisiej 
same. 




7 2 3 7 6 6 2 
01/23/7? 3=05 Pfl l O . C O 
H A N C Y W O R K M A N 
RECORDER* SALT LAKE COUHTYr UTAH 
SUTHERLAND TITLE 
REC BT'R FRESQUES DEPUTY - H I 
Trial Exhibit 3 
Warranty Deed 




















Recorded a t Request of 
a t M. Fee Paid ?_ 
by . Dep. Book_ Page_ .Bef.: 
Mail tax notice to_ fe^K^ •gust-
WARRANTY DEED 
Aridr^tfthrr ^ o ^-ft-tuj) /v^u7 [7/2 . 
CABOLYN ABBOTT 
of SALT LAKE CITT\UTAH 
CONVEY and WARPwANT 
KOBEKX D. IRVINE 
, County of SALT LAKE 
to 
grantor 
, State of Utah, hereby 
of SALT LAKE CXTI, UTAH 
TEH AND NO/100 
and other good and valuable consideration 
the following- described tract of land in 
State of Utah : 
grantee 
for the sum of 
DOLLARS, 
SALT LAKE County, 
Commencing 272-25 f e e t West from S o u t h e a s t 
Corner Lo t 1 , Block 12 , 5 Acre P l a t "A" , 
A Big E i e l d Survey; West 66 f e e t ; N o r t h 170-1 
f e e t ; E a s t 66 f e e t ; South 170-1 f e e t t o b e g i n n i n g . 
i l ,-/g- I SI-0/3 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantor , this 
Signed in the Presence of 
^XQ^h- day of ' 
^ g ^ t ^ ^ L 
Carolyn Aobott 
STATE OF UTAH, 
S a l t Lalce County of 
i ; 
On the "2^ £? ^ day of 
personally appeared before me Caro lyn Abbot t 
the signer of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that she executed the 
_ _ NOTARY PUBLIC 
/ £ ^ 5 § \ Rog«r A. Sutherland 
>





8 2 5 1 9 0 1 
06/03/2002 03:58 Ptt 1 2 . . OO 
Book - 8605 P3 - 15A4-1^5 
G A R Y W- O T T 
RECORDS, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
SUTHERLAND TITLE 
BT: SLH, DEFUH - HI 2 P . 
TrrtxJ 4*G booiv t?a3 dQ 3 
/-n 
Trial Exhibit 7 
Correspondence by Ada R. Craig 













February 2, 1999 
Dear Colleen; 
I didn't think I would ever be writing a letter to one of my children pleading for what 
already belongs to me. I now find it necessary to write to two of my children who have taken the 
position that the home that I have owned for over fifty years no longer belongs to me. I have 
provided a comfortable home for bothof you for your entire lives. I didn't think that I would 
ever need the services of a care center, but like many others I now find myself in that position. I 
know that you enjoy being comfortable, I too would enjoy being comfortable for the balance of 
my life. I don't need a spacious house, but I would at least like the comfort of a private room of 
my own in this care center. At the time I signed a quit claim deeding one third of my home to 
each of you, I was concerned about Mark's wife causing some kind of a problem that could place 
my house in jeopardy. Also at that time you were single and my other children were married and 
living on their own. There have been many changes since then, both of you are now married like 
my other children and have husbands to see to your needs. I don't have a husband to see to my 
needs, all I have is my home and I need the funds from the sale of my home. It was never my 
intention that each of you receive one third of my home until my death and you know that as well 
as I do. I have never asked for financial help from any of my children and don't intend to start 
now. I worked very hard for many years remodeling and improving my home to make it a good 
home for my family. I spent a lot of money in the process, my money, not yours. 
Sharon you told me you would not sign a quit claim deed back to me because Colleen 
would get mad at you and never let you see little Mark again. Shame on you Colleen for using 
your son as a bargaining chip against your mother. It's becoming very obvious to me that my 
comfort doesn't hold very high priority with either of you. As you are aware Bob now has power 
of attorney over me and all my affairs, and in that power of attorney any and all prior powers of 
attorney of any nature are revoked and terminated. Bob has asked you both for information and 
papers to assist us in taking care of my affairs. Colleen you told him that you didn't have to give 
him anything. Let me remind you Colleen you are and have been living in my home for 46 years 
using my furniture and my belongings. The items that Bob asked for belong to me, not you. I 
am asking you now to either bring them to me or have them available to be picked up by 
February 8th. The following are the items that I would like: 
1-My 1998 bank statements and checks (copies are available from the bank for $600.00) 
2-Items from my safety deposit box 
3-My purses and wallet together with credit cards, etc. 
4-My equitable life policy (medical) and card 
5-All my social security information and card 
6-A11 my 1998 paid bills including medical 
7-Copy of my will 
8-All my medicare information, bills and card 
9-My 1997 income tax copies (federal and state) 
10-My light and magnifying instrument 
11-My hearing aid coupons 
12-Balance of my credit union savings account or an explanation as to the use of the funds 
13-My metal can and its contents 
Please call me and tell me if youarc going to bring these or if I need to arrange to have 
them picked up. 
I love all my children and grand children and desire to see them all. My needs have 
changed drastically in just a short while and I need your cooperation. When the funds from the 
sale of my home are no longer needed in my behalf, it is my desire that you will receive your 
share of those funds as was intended when I quit claimed the home to the three of us. 
J-p^-&^ 
Trial Exhibit 8 
Durable Power of Attorney 
of Ada R. Craig 















DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that I, Ada Rae Craig, have made, constituted 
and appointed and by these presents do make, constitute and appoint Robert Douglas Irvine, my 
true and lawful attorney for me and in ray name, place and stead, giving and granting unto my said 
attorney full power and authority to do and perform all and every act and thing requisite and 
necessary to be done in connection with my affairs, including, but not limited to, dealing with any 
real or personal property that I may own or may hereafter acquire; to receive, collect and recover all 
sums of money, debts and accounts due me; to sue and use all other lawful means to collect all such 
money, debts, and accounts; to compromise all claims by or against me; to pay fium my fonds all 
of my just debts and obligations; to expend funds for my support and maintenance; to create a 
revocable or irrevocable trust during my lifetime and to transfer my property to the trustees thereof; 
which trust may extend beyond my lifetime; to create and sever joint tenancies of property; and to 
arrange and pay for any medical or nursing home care thatl may require during my lifetime* THIS 
POWER OF ATTORNEY SHALL NOT BE AFFECTED BY MY DISABILITY, I hereby ratify 
and confirm all that my said attorney Robert Douglas Irvine may lawfully do and cause to be done 
by virtue of these presents, and I hereby specifically and completely revoke and terminate any and 
all powers of attorney of any nature previously executed and granted by me. 
IN WITNESS WHERJEOF, I have hereunto set my hand this / / day of January, 1999. 
g4 1k fe^4 
Ada Rae Craig ~r 
STATE OF y^J&Js ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me th i s / / day of January, 1999, by 






My Commission Expires: ^//fiflffi 
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offered my s i s t e r and I each $10,000 i f we would deed t h e 
property to him. 
Q Okay. My q u e s t i o n was d i d n ' t your s i s t e r t h r e a t e n 
you or did she t h r e a t e n you in any way wi th not see ing her son 
Mark? 
A She d id n o t . 
Q Has your sister ever threatened you to not see her 
son -
A She had not. 
Q - if you didn't cooperate with her? 
How many years did you live in the house, 
approximately with your mother, or from what period of time to 
what period of time, if that would be easier? 
A From 1954 to 1997. 
Q You were born when she was living in that house? 
A Yes. 
Q You didn't pay your mother any money for an interest 
in the house, did you? 
A No. 
Q In your responses to the interrogatories, there was 
question asked what you paid for the house and the answer that 
was provided was you paid $10, care, love and affection. And 
understand the care, love, and affection part, but actually to 
be completely accurate you didn't even pay the $10 for an 
interest in the house; isn't that true? 
regarding the specific terms of the Will - or excuse me, of the 
1981 deed, did she? 
A Only that she wanted Colleen and I to have the 
property. 
Q Now, isn't it true that she wanted you to essentially 
inherit that home upon her death? 
A That's correct. 
Q And your understanding was you wouldn't get that 
inheritance until she died. 
A Correct. 
Q Did you receive the letter dated February 1999 that 
we marked as Exhibit 7 that's before you? 
A I did. 
Q Did that come m the mail to you? 
A Yes, it did. 
Q Did you contact your mother in response to the letter 
about the ownership interest in the house? 
A No, I did not. 
Q In fact you didn't object to your mother in any way 
about what the ownership interest in response to that letter; 
isn't that true? 
A I -
Q You didn't call your mom up and say, "This isn't 
right." You didn't call Bob up and say, "That's not true." 
A My mother wouldn't understand. I couldn't call my 
you the property completely,, other than her life estate, did 
she? 
THE COURT: I don't understand the question. 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: Okay. 
Q (BY MR. CARTWRIGHT) Your mom didn't tell you back 
around 1981 that she was signing that deed and by•signing that 
deed she was giving away all of her interests, except for her 
life estate? 
A Shar had a third and I had a third and my mom had a 
third, contingent upon the life estate of the property. 
Q Okay, so it was your understanding that, that Sharon 
owned a third of the property. It was a third hers, correct? 
A Well, actually wouldn't become a third of hers. 
Q Well now -
A Well I guess what I'm saying. It is a third. 
Q Okay. 
A Sharon had, did have a third. 
Q All right, so it was your perception that Sharon 
owned a third and you owned a third and your mom owned a third 
arfd when she died you and Sharon would own, together you'd own 
it all? 
A With full rights of survivorship Sharon and I would 
end up with it. 
Q Okay. And before your death you each owned a third? 
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O A 1 COO 1 1 OC 
1 A I live at 4931 Fairview Drive, Salt Lake City, 
2 Utah. 
3 Q What's your background or occupation? 
4 A Ifm a general contractor. 
5 Q Now you are a son of Ada Irvine, Ada Craig; is that 
6 correct? 
7 A Yes, sir. 
8 Q What I'd like you to do is explain to the Court the 
9 relationship with Ada, with you, the children, and the 
10 defendants and how the family is put together. So if you 
11 could walk over here to the board. Stand up and come over 
12 here. Here's a marker and why don't you start with Ada and 
13 your dad, where the family starts there. 
14 A My mother and father married. Her maiden name was 
15 Ada Rae Snow, later Ada Irvine. They married in I believe in 
16 1935. They had three children. 
17 Q So three children from your mother and Ray? 
18 A Yes. 
19 I Q Did they ultimately divorce? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q Do you remember approximately when that was? 
22 A I believe that was 1974. 
23 Q This was before the home was purchased that we're 
24 I here talking about today, correct? 
25 I A Yes, that's correct. 
1 Q What's the address of that home, do you recall? 
2 A (Inaudible) 251 East 1700 South, Salt Lake City. 
3 Q How was that home acquired originally? 
4 A My father purchased it. 
5 Q Do you recall approximately when that home was 
6 purchased by your father? 
7 A 1948. 
8 Q Was this before or after the divorce? 
9 A After. 
10 Q Your mom was later remarried; is that correct? 
11 A She was, I believe in 1949. 
12 Q So the home was purchased after the divorce with 
13 Ray but before she subsequently remarried. 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q Who did she remarry? 
16 J A Forrest (inaudible). 
17 Q Write his name down. And to be clear, why don't 
18 you put a line and put Ada next to that too to show they were 
19 married. Did they have - did Forrest and Ada have children 
20 together? 
21 I A Yes. 
22 Q Which children did they have? 
23 A Mark (inaudible) and Sharon. 
24 Q Write their first names down there. All right. 
25 And what happened to this marriage? 
1 A Forrest (inaudible) passed away in 1979. 
2 Q Okay. Put at the bottom there something like 
3 Forrest died in 1979. Thank you. That's good for now. You 
4 can sit back over here. 
5 Do you know why your father, Ray, purchased the 
6 home for Ada after the divorce? 
7 A Well, he had an ex-wife and three children and she 
8 didn't work and so he was our support. 
9 Q All right. I'd like to direct your attention to 
10 about 1981. Do you recall your mother signing a deed in 1981 
11 on the house that we're talking about? 
12 A Do I recall her signing a deed? No. 
13 Q Are you aware that she did? 
14 A I am. 
15 Q But you didn't know she signed it? 
16 A No, I did not. 
17 MR. CARTWRIGHT: All right. May I approach? 
18 THE COURT: Of course. 
19 Q (BY MR. CARTWRIGHT) I'm showing you what's been 
20 marked as Exhibit 1 which purports to be a Quit Claim Deed. 
21 Have you seen this document before? 
22 A I have. 
23 Q In what context have you seen the document? 
24 A Pertaining to my mother's needs for moving into the 
25 care center and this being the only asset that she had. 
1 was $173.68. She was receiving social security in the amount 
2 of, I believe $770 or $80 in 1999. It escalated between 1999 
3 and 2003 when she passed away but I believe it was $780 in 
4 1999. 
5 Q So if you take $780 in social security plus 
6 retirement of $173 and the annuity, that's approximately 
7 $1,000 a month. 
8 A Yes, sir 
9 Q Did she have any other income besides that 9 
10 A No. 
11 Q Did your mother, Ada, did there come a time when 
12 she left the home and ended up in the hospital or a care 
13 center9 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q When was that 9 
16 A Well, in 1998 she, a couple of times, two or three 
17 times, as a matter of fact was in either a care center or a 
18 rehab area or the hospital. St Mark's Hospital was 
19 generally the hospital. 
20 Q So she was in St. Mark's Hospital for health 
21 reasons9 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q Do you know what the health reasons w e r e 9 
24 I A Well, various health reasons. I think she had some 
25 stomach problems She had an operation on her stomach at one 
1 point in time, just several reasons, urinary infections 
2 seemed to be quite frequent. 
3 J Q Did she ever go to a psychiatric unit in the 
hospital or anything like that? 
5 I A Not to my knowledge. 
6 Q You mentioned she was in St. Mark's Hospital. What 
7 J happened to her after she left St. Mark's Hospital? 
A She was in St. Mark's Hospital and was then 
9 I discharged to a facility on 700 East I believe called the 
10 Woodland Care Center. She arrived there in the afternoon one 
11 day and I was there as well as the - I don't remember whether 
12 both Sharon and Colleen were there or one but 1 was there and 
13 they got her situated in a room, there were others in that 
14 room and had her settled down and resting and I left that 
15 afternoon. I returned the following morning and she wasn't 
16 there where I'd seen her the previous day. So I went to the 
17 desk and asked where they had moved Ada Craig to, thinking 
18 that they'd moved her to another room or something. They 
19 said no, she's not here any more, she's back in the St. 
20 Mark's Hospital due to a problem that occurred here last 
21 night. 
22 Q A health problem? 
23 A They were a little bit upset with me to begin with. 
24 They said that her son, Mark, had some by and apparently had 
25 raised some kind of confusion and ruckus because of what he 
A Yes. 
Q When was that? 
A The 11th of January 1999, a week after she'd moved 
into the Heritage Eastridge. 
Q So how did you get the authority to make those 
decisions? 
A The first morning that I visited my mother and she 
tfas so unhappy, m fact she'd hurt herself trying to get into 
use the bathroom, hurt her arm. She just was crying. She 
didn't want to be there. She wanted to go back where she had 
been to the Highland Care Center and I said, mom, you know, 
there's nothing I can do. You've given that authority to 
someone else and they're making those decisions for you and I 
can't change that and a lady by the name of Mary Carlson who 
worked at the Heritage Eastridge was there and she said, 
"Well, Mrs. Craig, you can make a new power of attorney is 
you want to. If you don't want to be here you can go to the 
Highland — 
MR. SWENSEN: Objection, Your Honor, hearsay. 
THE COURT: Sustained as to what this person at the 
care center said. 
Q (BY MR. CARTWRIGHT) So what did your mother do in 
response to this conversation? 
A She said well then let's change the power of 
attorney. 
1 MR. SWENSEN: Objection, Your Honor, hearsay. 
2 J MR. CARTWRIGHT: Your Honor, here I'm offering this 
3 I testimony to show her intent in entering into this agreement. 
4 THE COURT: I'm going to allow the testimony as to 
5 what was said from any source. It's clearly (inaudible). 
6 Q (BY MR. CARTWRIGHT) I'm showing you what's been 
1 marked as Exhibit 8. 
8 THE COURT: Exhibit what? 
9 MR. CARTWRIGHT: Exhibit 8. 
H) Q (BY MR. CARTWRIGHT) Have you seen this document 
11 before? 
12 A Yes, s i r . 
13 Q What i s i t ? 
24 A It's a durable power of attorney-
15 Q Do you see the signature line on the document? 
16 A I do. 
17 Q Whose name appears there? 
18 A My mother's. 
9 Q Are you familiar with the signature contained on 
20 the durable power of attorney 9 
21 A Yes, I am. 
22 Q How are you familiar with this signature here? 
23 A Well, as you can see that's considerably different 
24 from the signature that we see on the 1981 deed. As my 
25 mother has gotten older and her health was not as good as it 
1 had been in the past, her signature was not as good as it had 
2 been in the past. 
3 Q So how do you know that it's your mom's signature? 
4 A I watched her sign it. 
5 MR. CARTWRIGHT: I offer Exhibit 8. 
6 THE COURT: Any objection? 
7 J MR. SWENSEN: No objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Received. 
9 I (Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 received) 
10 Q (BY MR. CARTWRIGHT) With this power of attorney in 
11 hand, what did you do as far as managing her care? 
12 A Well, that first day that I visited her at the 
13 Heritage Eastridge and she wanted to change the power of 
14 I attorney, I immediately went down to Highland Care Center to 
15 see if there was space available for her and they said that 
16 there was not right at that time but there would be in a 
17 couple of weeks. So I went back and told my mother we'd have 
18 to endure where she was for a couple of weeks and as soon as 
19 t that time concluded we'd be able to move where she wanted to 
20 be. 
21 Q What role did you have in the preparation or the 
22 signing of the power of attorney? 
23 A I contacted an attorney to have it prepared and 
24 called for a fellow to come and be the notary and 1 was there 
25 as well and asked the lady at the care center if she would 
witness it. 
Q How was your mother's eyesight at the time she 
signed this document? 
A My mother had macular degeneration which I have 
myself and her eyesight was not wonderful. The manr the 
notary that signed it, read it to her. If I were to just 
hand it to her, she wouldn't be able to read it without a 
magnifying glass. 
Q Did your mother express any objections or questions 
regarding the power of attorney? 
A No. 
Q Could you see whether she wanted to sign it or 
didn't want to sign it or anything? 
A She was anxious to sign it. 
Q Why was that? 
A Because she knew she could move and be away from 
there. 
Q All right. So you ultimately helped her get back 
to Highland Ranch? 
A Yes. 
Q How did she do once she was back at Highland Ranch? 
A Very good. 
Q How much did Highland Ranch cost? 
A Highland Care Center? 
Q Excuse me? 
1 A Did you just say Highland Ranch? It's Highland 
2 Care Center. 
3 Q Oh, okay, Highland Care. 
4 A How much did it cost? 
5 Q Right. 
6 A When we first moved in the only room that they had 
7 | available was a room where she shared with another lady and 
as I recall it was around $4500 a month. After we were there 
a short time we could see that it would be better if she had 
10 I her own room. My mother had a hearing problem as well and 
11 she loved her TV. She had a large screen TV and she loved 
12 her western music, country-western station and for her to 
13 enjoy it, the sound had to be up a little louder than maybe 
14 for most. The lady that she shared the room with had 
15 excellent hearing so that was a problem for her. So we just 
16 felt we just would be better off if we just had a private 
17 room for her so that she could live and enjoy the things that 
18 she wanted. 
19 Q How much did the private room cost? 
20 A It was another $700 or $800 a month. I've 
21 forgotten exactly. 
22 Q Were there activities for the residents at the 
23 Highland Care Center? 
24 A Yes, many. 
















of the challenge and my mother enjoyed it there. 
Q Who paid for Highland Care Center costs while she 
was there? 
A I did. 
Q Approximately how much did you spend on your 
mother' s behalf? 
A About $175,000 roughly. 
Q That was over three or four years? 
A Yes sir. I should qualify that and say my wife and 
I, not just I. 
Q I'm showing you what's been marked as Exhibit No. 
5. Do you recognize this? 
A Yes. 
Q What is it? 
A That's a list of the expenses that my wife and I 
contributed to her care. On the right-hand side is another 
column where my brother contributed to her care as well, my 
brother Raymond. 
Q Does this contain a record of the - well, how did 
you contribute payments on your mother' s behalf? 
A I just made checks and deposited to her account. 
We wanted everything to go through her account that pertained 
to her. 
Q Are those deposits reflected in these records, in 
Exhibit 5? 
1 A They are. 
2 Q And how did you make expenditures on your mother's 
3 behalf? 
4 A With her checking account. 
5 Q And those are also reflected in Exhibit 5? 
6 A Yes, they are. 
7 J Q Whose handwriting is on the records here? 
A This is my handwriting. 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: I offer Exhibit 5. 
10 I THE COURT: Any objection? 
11 MR. SWENSEN: No objection. 
12 THE COURT: It will be received. 
13 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 received) 
14 Q (BY MR. CARTWRIGHT) Could Ada have paid for own 
15 I expenses rather than you doing that? 
16 A With her funds? 
17 Q What I mean isf did she have the resources to meet 
18 her needs? 
19 A Only with her home. 
20 Q Did Ada ever discuss with you who she believed 
21 owned the home? 
-22 A She felt she owned the home. She thought it was 
i3 hers. 
M MR. SWENSEN: Objection, Your Honor, hearsay. 
25 MR. CARTWRIGHT: Again, Your Honor -
1 MR. SWENSEN: Hearsay. 
2 THE COURT: Overruled. I'm going to have to have 
3 j specifics as to what she said, not what he thinks she 
4 thought. There's no foundation for that. 
5 Q (BY MR. CARTWRIGHT) All right. Did you have 
6 conversations with your mother about who owned the home? 
7 A Many times. 
8 Q When's the first time you recall having that 
9 conversation? 
10 A In those first couple of days when we moved from 
11 the Heritage Eastridge down to the Highland Care Center. 
12 Q So when she went back to Highland Care Center for 
13 the second time? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q And where was your mother when you were there with 
16 her? 
17 A In her room. 
IB Q I said that wrong. Where was your mother when she 
19 made those statements? 
20 A In her room. 
21 Q Who was there when those statements were made? 
22 I A Oh golly, from time to time there might have been 
23 several different people but primarily myself or - primarily 
24 myself. 
25 Q On how many occasions did you mom - what did your 
1 mom say when she talked about she owning the home? 
2 A Well, she'd say -
3 MR. SWENSEN: Objection Your Honor, this would be 
4 hea r say . 
5 1 THE COURT: O v e r r u l e d . 
6 Continue. 
7 THE WITNESS: My mother when she married Forrest 
8 Craig truly thereafter, he started remodeling the home and 
9 that went on for 20 years or more, making changes and 
10 improvements and my mother lived through all of that, the 
11 times when the bathrooms were torn up or the kitchen was torn 
12 up or some part of the house and it wouldn't be like a 
13 contractor coming in and do it. He did it as he had time and 
14 they had the funds to do it but my mother participated in 
15 that and she would say many times, that's my home, I'm the 
16 one that got up on the sawhorses and sanded the sheetrock, 
17 I'm the one that helped paint, I'm the one that helped clean 
18 up the mess after all that. That's my home. 
19 Q When did she make those statements? Were those 
2U made during remodeling or when we're talking -
21 A At the Highland Care Center, frequently. 
11 Q Did your mother make a distinction between owning a 
23 one third interest with the life estate or owning a home or 
24 did she talk about that? 
25 A No. 
Q Did she ever talk to you about the 1981 deed that 
2 she'd signed? 
3 A When we talked about how we were going to pay for 
4 her to be at the Highland Care Center, her only asset was her 
t 5 J home. Of course she expected that the girls in her mind, 
>6 that they would deed that back to her. I contacted an 
7 I attorney and he had us get a title report. We got a title 
8 report and that's when we found out that their names were on 
9 the deed. I talked to my mother about it and she said, yes, 
10 she remembered doing that. I guess like most of us, she 
11 probably never thought that that would happen to her like we 
12 don't think it'll happen to us, they'll have a need or we'll 
13 have need for those things in our later life but nevertheless 
14 she needed it and — 
15 Q Let's focus on the time when she discovered or 
.16 after you contacted the attorney and you talked specifically 
27 about the terms of the 1981 deed. Do you recall any specific 
18 statements by your mother about the nature of the interest 
§5 she held and the daughters held? 
3ft A Why it was that way? 
Stt Q Right. 
[22 A I, of course, asked her why it was done and she 
HI told me that he son Mark had married just prior to that and 
24 that was an unfortunate situation for him. He had married a 
%% J girl who was working in a law firm. I don't know whether she 
1 was a paralegal or at least affiliated with a law firm and 
2 Mark and this girl were going through a nasty divorce and my 
3 mother said they were worried that she would cause them some 
4 grief over this house. That's what I was told by my mother. 
5 Q Did the specific context of how much the daughters 
6 owned as compared to her, what she owned ever come up m 
7 1999? 
8 A Just that she owned a third of the house plus the 
9 life estate, the right to use the house, she couldn't 
10 I mortgage it or sell it but she had the right to use it or 
11 rent it. 
12 Q All right. So she mentioned she owned a third of 
13 the house. Did she ever say that she didn't own anything 
14 other than a life estate or did she make any statements like 
15 that? 
16 A No, no. She felt it was her home. 
17 THE COURT: I'm sorry, sir? 
18 THE WITNESS: She said it was her home. 
19 Q (BY MR. CARTWRIGHT) Did you or your mother take 
20 any actions to obtain funds out of the home for her care? 
21 A Yes. We had an attorney contact - Colleen and 
22 Sharon had an attorney by this time. When we moved my mother 
23 into the Highland Care Center, number one, that very day, 
24 Sharon said to me we need to sell the home and I said that's 
25 good idea. That's basically what was said. 
k 
Q When you refer to Sharon, you're talking about one 
2 of the defendants9 
3 | A The daughter, Sharon, yes. Please ask the question 
4 J again. 
5 I Q I've forgotten what I asked. I've forgotten where 
§\ I was at so let me start over there. You were talking about 
7 obtaining funds to pay for her care. You talked about 
8 Sharon's statement. What did Sharon say? 
51 A We were standing in the hall — 
KM MR. SWENSEN: It's hearsay again. 
It THE COURT: Pardon me? 
12 MR. SWENSEN: Hearsay. 
13 THE COURT: As to your client? 
14 MR. SWENSEN: Yes. 
15| THE COURT: Overruled. 
~&\ MR. CARTWRIGHT: Go ahead. 
1? THE WITNESS: We were standing m the hall. We had 
£B j ]ust moved our mother down there. I was there, my wife was 
£H there, my two sons, Sharon and her husband were there. They 
|S assisted, helping us take mother down to the Highland Care 
It j Center. Sharon was pleased and happy that that was happening 
2f because now mom was going to be happy where she was. Of 
23 course we knew that Highland Care Center was going to expect 
r \ 
*s I 
24 j to be paid and Sharon just said, "We need to sell the house," 
25 and I said "That would be a good idea" and that's what was 
said. 
Q (BY MR. CARTWRIGHT) Did you follow through with 
Sharon on selling the house? 
A Yes, we talked about it and I got a call from 
Colleen, telling me never to call Sharon again, never talk to 
her again. 
Q Did she say why? 
A In between all the words that I was hearing, I 
don't recall that she said why. 
Q You don't need to say the words but can you be more 
specific about what you talked about? 
A She spent most of her time just calling me names 
and telling me what she thought of me and so on. 
Q Did you ever participate in a Quit Claim Deed from 
your mother to Carolyn regarding the property? 
A I did. 
Q Tell me what happened with regard to this 
transaction. 
A Well, when we talked to mother and explained to her 
the problem with the ownership of the home, she thought that 
- she said that the girls would be willing to sign it over 
which they were not but we contacted an attorney and he 
reviewed the title report and said, well, she owns a third of 
the house plus the right to use it. She can either live in 
the house or she can rent the house but she can't sell the 
house and so we talked about it and decided, well, maybe we 
better rent the house and at least get some return to help 
pay toward mother's expenses. 
Q I'm showing you what's been marked as Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 2. Do you recognize that document? 
A I do. 
Q What is it? 
A It's a Quit Claim Deed from my mother to Carolyn 
Abbott, my sister. 
Q Do you know who prepared this deed? 
A It was prepared by Larry Moore at Ray, Quinney and 
Nebeker. 
Q This deed has a date at the bottom of January 21, 
1999, is that when you recall it being prepared? 
A I believe so. 
Q Do you see a signature at the bottom of the deed? 
A My mother's signature, yes. 
Q Did you see her sign that? 
A I did. 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: I offer Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. SWENSEN: No objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Received. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 received) 
Q (BY MR. CARTWRIGHT) Why was the property deeded to 
/^i 
Carolyn? 
A Larry Moore advised my mother and I that she could 
salvage the one third of the house and probably ought to deed 
it to another party and he said, Bob, you probably ought to 
encourage your mother not to deed it to you because you have 
power of attorney and it would appear as though you were 
trying to take a part of her house and he said, you have 
other brothers and sisters and I said, yes, I have a brother 
Ray and a sister Carolyn. My brother lives in California, my 
sister lives in Salt Lake. And he said I'd advise her to 
deed it to your sister. So we talked to mother about it and 
she said that would be fine, that's what we ought to do and 
so that's what happened. 
Q Who was present at the time that Ada signed the 
Quit Claim Deed to Carolyn? 
A Myself, of course my mother and myself and Daryl 
Thaxton who is a notary public. 
Q Anyone else m the room that you remember? 
A I don't remember anyone else being m the room, 
whether there was a nurse's aid or not I don't recall. They 
were always in or out but I don't recall anyone else. 
Q Do you remember approximately what time of day it 
was when she signed it? 
A Oh golly, I don't. 
Q Do you remember Ada's demeanor at the time she 
1 I signed the deed? 
2 A She was fine. 
i 
3 I Q How did she know what she was signing if she had 
4 difficulty reading? 
5 A It was read to her. 
6 Q Difficulty seeing? 
7 1 A It was read to her. 
8 Q Do you recall who read the deed to her? 
9 A I believe I read the Quit Claim Deed to her. 
40 I Q Could you tell whether your mother knew where she 
^1 was? 
.12 A Oh, she knew where she was. 
13 J Q Could you tell whether she knew what she was doing? 
14 A She knew what she was doing. 
15 j Q How could you tell? 
16 A My mother was sharp. 
17 Q Was she sharp on the day she signed the deed? 
IB
 f A Yes, she was. 
45 Q Now, you ultimately received an interest in the 
;50 house; is that correct? 
£i A I did. 
'Tl Q Could you explain how that happened? 
23 A Well, three years later, I believe three years 
24 later, my sister Carolyn because we'd never gotten any 
~25 cooperation from the others, we continued to pay for mother's 
I 36 
1 care and Carolyn said, xxYou ought to have that portion of the 
2 house, Bob." And so she deeded it to me. 
3 Q Did you pay any money for that? 
4 A No. 
5 Q Did Carolyn pay any money to Ada for the Quit Claim 
6 Deed that went to her? 
7 A No. 
8 Q What was the understanding - well, are you aware of 
9 what Ada's understanding was of why she was signing her 
10 interest away to Carolyn? 
11 A She was signing her interest away to protect it, 
12 frankly with the intent of all of the girls signing it all 
13 back to her so that we could use those funds to care for her. 
14 Q Now, how do you know that's what your mother's 
15 intentions were? 
16 ] A Because we discussed it, talked about it. 
%1 Q I'm showing you what's been marked as Plaintiff's 
18] Exhibit No. 3. Do you recognize that document? 
p A I do. 
20 ] Q What is it? 
A It's a warranty deed from my sister Carolyn to me 
for the third of the property that had been deeded from my 
mother to her. 
Q Do you see the signature down there that says 





A I do. 
2 1 Q Do you know whose signature that is? 
3 A My sister Carolyn's. 
4 Q How do you know that? 
5 A Well, I was there to witness it. I saw her sign 
6 her it. 
7 MR. CARTWRIGHT: I offer Plaintiff's Exhibit 3. 
8 THE COURT: Any objection? 
9 MR. SWENSEN: No objection. 
M THE COURT: Received. 
11 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 received) 
12 Q (BY MR. CARTWRIGHT) Do you know whether your 
13 mother ever contacted her daughters either orally or in 
14 writing regarding everyone's claims to the property? 
15 A Yes, she did. She contacted them both orally and 
16 m writing. 
17 Q Let's talk about the oral part first. Do you 
18 recall any specific occasion when Ada contacted Sharon or 
19 Colleen? 
20 A Well, she talked to them on the telephone several 
21 times and would ask and they didn't want to talk about it. 




Q Now how do you know that she called them? 
A I was there a time or two when she had but she 
would tell me about the calls as well. 
A February 2nd, 1999. 
Q Could you turn to Page 2 of that? What does that 
say in the handwriting on Page 2 9 
A All my love, mom. 
Q Do you know whose handwriting that is? 
A That's my mother's. 
Q How do you know that9 
A I watched her sign it. 
Q Would you explain how this letter came to be9 
A As I mentioned a moment ago, she wasn't making any 
progress in talking to them and so we discussed maybe writing 
a letter and sending it to them so that she could have some 
of these things that she wanted and needed and discuss how 
her affairs needed to be taken care of. That's how it came 
about. 
Q On the first page of the letter, m almost the 
middle of the first paragraph, there is a sentence that 
begins, "At the time" do you see that? 
A Say that again. 
Q "At the time I signed". Could you read that 
sentence out loud please9 
A "At the time I signed a Quit Claim deeding one 
third of my home to each of you I was concerned about Mark's 
wife causing some kind of a problem that could place my house 
in jeopardy." 
* 
1 Q Do you know what that sentence refers to? 
2 A Well, just as I mentioned earlier, Mark has married 
3 a girl that had looked for a law firm and they were going 
4 through a nasty problem and I don't know whether it was my 
5 mother's idea or Colleen or Sharon's idea to do this deed but 
6 the story that I was told by my mother was that there was 
7 concern about Mark's wife or ex-wife-to-be getting involved 
$ in the house and causing some problems for them. 
t Q All right. Now the letter I see is typed and I 
10 assume your mother didn't type i t 9 
 1 
11 A No, she did not. 
tZ Q Explain how this went from your conversation to the 
11 final form. 
W A Well, my mother and I composed the letter there m 
H i her room and then my son Scott typed it for her. 
16 j Q Then what did Scott do with the type written note 9 
i! A He gave it back to - I don't know whether he gave 
!£ it to me or my mother but then we read it and reviewed it and 
£3 my mother approved it and signed it. 
20 Q Do you recall any specific comments your - who read 
21 it after it was typed u p 9 
22 A I believe my son read it and I believe I read it as 
23 well. 
H\ Q I mean-
25 A To her 
1 Q Ohf to her? 
,2 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
*3 j Q Do you remember any specific comments that your mom 
4 had once it was read to her by either you or Scott? 
5 J A No, she was satisfied with it and as you can note 
4\ by the way she signed it, all my love, mom, my mother loved 
7| all of her children and grandchildren. 
Q Do you know what happened to this letter after your 
mother signed it9 
A We mailed it certified mail to Colleen and Sharon 
and then their attorney asked for copies and he was given 
copies as well. 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: Okay. Offer Exhibit 7. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. SWENSEN: No objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Received. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 7 received) 
Q (BY MR. CARTWRIGHT) You had mentioned earlier 
about how Sharon and Colleen were not selling, did not agree 
to sell the house or their interest m the house or whatever. 
A Right. 
Q Do you recall any response of your mother 
specifically to Sharon not agreeing to convey whatever 
interest in the house? 
A She said, "I could understand Colleen acting this 
way but I can't understand Sharon treating me this way." 
Q In regards to your sister, Carolyn, do you owe her 
any money? 
A No. 
Q Owe her any debts or obligations at all? 
A No. 
Q Does she owe anything to you? 
A No. 
Q Has your mother Ada ever told you that, other than 
her life estate, she gave the rest of the interest in the 
house to anyone? 
A No. 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: That's all I have. 
THE COURT: Cross examination. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SWENSEN: 
Q Mr. Irvine, I just have a couple of questions to 
clarify some points here. 
A Okay. 
Q In the diagram that you've put on the board you 
indicated that the divorce occurred m 1944. My recollection 
is you said the house was purchased in 1945. 
A M 8 . 
Q 1948? 
A I'm sorry, M 8 . 
htsfr't* 
WZ-4 
Q Did he know your mother had a home? 
A Yes, I told him that she did. 
Q So you broached the subject with him about your 
mother' s home? 
A Yes, uh-huh (affirmative). My mother and I had 
talked about it, so I explained to him my mother had a home 
and we had the need of taking care of her now and what were 
we to do? 
Q And what was the object there9 So that you could 
assist your mother — 
A Sell the home, yes. 
Q If the intent then was to sell the home, why did 
your mother convey her third interest to Carolyn? 
A At the advice of Larry Moore, that to protect that 
third interest she could deed that to another one of her 
children or someone else and salvage that third- It appeared 
that the others were not going to participate so it was his 
advice. 
Q Okay, sell (inaudible)9 
A Hopefully that we could have sold that one third 
and they would have bought it out, that they would have 
bought that third from their mother. 
Q Okay. If the object was to use the home for Ada's 
support, why didn't she receive any consideration for the 
conveyance to Carolyn9 
A That's what I was told. 
Q Do you know when he was divorced? 
A I don't recall. 
Q Do you know when he was married? 
A I don't. 
Q Do you know if he was even married at this time? 
A No I don't. 
MR. SWENSEN: Thank you, Mr. Irvine, that's all. 
THE COURT: Redirect? 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: Just one issue. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CARTWRIGHT: 
Q In regards to when the property was quit claimed 
from Ada to her daughter Carolyn, was Carolyn buying that 
property? 
A No, she was not buying it. 
Q Why did it go to her? 
A In hopes that we would be able to sell that portion 
of the home to acquire funds for my mother's care. 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: That's all. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Anything further Mr. Swensen? 
MR. SWENSEN: Yes Your Honor, just a clarification 
on that same matter. 
/// 
/// 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT IRVINE, 
Plaintiff, ; 
V S . j 
SHARON CRAIG ANDERSON and ] 
COLLEEN CRAIG ERICKSON, ] 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No. 030920001 
i Judge Hanson 
Defendants. 
The above-entitled matter was tried to the Court, the Honorable Timothy R. 
Hanson, sitting without a jury on September 28 and 29th, 2004. The plaintiff, Robert D. 
Irvine, was represented by John Burton Anderson and Joe Cartwright. The defendants, 
Sharon Craig Anderson and Colleen Craig Erickson were represented by James G. 
Swensen, Jr. The Court heard the testimony of a number of witnesses, received and 
reviewed numerous written exhibits, and evaluated the arguments of counsel. The Court 
announced its decision on this case on October 14, 2004. Being fully advised and 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
DEC - 6 20M 
pursuant to Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and based upon such testimony 
and evidence, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. There were two main issues presented at trial by the parties to the Court. 
First, what interest, if any, did Ada R. Craig ("Craig") have in the real property after 
executing the January 19, 1981 deed; and second, if Craig owned a joint tenancy interest 
in the real property following the execution of the January 19, 1981 deed, was she 
competent to transfer her interest in the property to her other daughter, Carolyn Abbott. 
2. Based upon the strict application of the words of the deed, the Court finds 
that Ada R. Craig conveyed to herself and to her daughters Sharon Craig Anderson and 
Colleen Craig Erickson the property in joint tenancy, with fxill rights of survivorship, and 
in addition to her one-third joint tenancy interest, Craig also granted to herself a life 
estate in the real property. 
3. The Court also finds that Ada Craig intended to grant under herself and to 
her daughters a joint tenancy interest in the property, and addition to her one-third joint 
tenancy interest, Craig also intended to grant to herself a life estate in the real property. 
4. There was not any believable or persuasive evidence that Ada Craig 
intended to abandon control of the day to day operations or control of the property while 
Ada was alive. The evidence suggests that she intended to retain control over the 
property. 
5. Following the execution of the 1981 deed, Ada Craig, Sharon Anderson 
and Colleen Erickson shared a one-third interest in the totality of the property as joint 
tenants, with rights of survivorship. 
6. Ada Craig retained a joint tenancy interest so that if one or both of her 
daughters predeceased her, a share or all of the property would return to Craig, and not go 
to another family member of the co-owner daughters. She was interested in giving the 
property to her daughters if she died, but was not interested in giving the property to one 
of her daughters' heirs if a daughter predeceased her. She therefore intended to retain a 
joint tenancy interest in the property. 
7. The life estate Craig retained in addition to her joint tenancy interest was 
also retained for another important purpose: By creating a life estate only for herself, Ada 
intended to retain day-to-day control of the property. The "reserving a life estate only" 
language in the 1981 deed was intended to reserve the life estate only in the name of Ada, 
and not in the name of her daughters, which excludes her two daughters from control of 
the property while Ada Craig was alive. 
8. The evidence shows that Ada Craig said she owned the property following 
the 1981 deed, and also that Colleen Erickson testified that this was a l/3rd, l/3rd, l/3rd 
ownership relationship between Ada, Colleen Erickson, and Sharon Anderson. Other 
witnesses who testified for plaintiff supported this interpretation of Ada Craig's 
ownership intent. 
9. Whether one looks to Ada's intent, or looking at the actual language of the 
1981 deed, the result is the same, as specified above. 
10. The Court finds that to the extent a joint tenancy interest and a life estate 
interest might somehow be inconsistent, which the Court does not believe they are, the 
joint tenancy estate is the greater estate than the life estate in this circumstance, and the 
life estate would therefore merge into the joint tenancy estate. 
11. Defendants have the burden of proving their claim by a preponderance of 
the evidence that Ada Craig was not competent to execute the Quit Claim Deed from Ada 
Craig to Carolyn Abbot on January 21, 1999 or the Last Will and Testament of Ada Craig 
dated February 10, 1999. 
12. The evidence does not support defendants' claims that Ada Craig was not 
competent in the signing of the 1999 documents. This evidence is presented by credible, 
independent, third-party witnesses, who did not demonstrate any bias or pecuniary 
interest. Such witnesses have shown that when the 1999 documents were signed, Ada 
Craig was mentally competent. She was active in the health care center activities, was 
able communicated her needs and desires, was mentally sharp, and did not demonstrate 
confusion during the periods of time the 1999 documents were signed. 
13. There is compelling evidence that supports the conclusion that Ada Craig 
was competent, and no compelling evidence that she was not competent when she signed 
the 1999 documents. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the Court makes the following 
Conclusions of Law: 
1. Ada Craig conveyed to Carolyn Abbott her one-third joint tenancy interest 
in the real property located at 251 E, 1700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, and Carolyn 
Abbott subsequently transferred this one-third interest to plaintiff Robert Irvine. 
2. The January 21, 1999 Quit Claim Deed signed by Ada Craig to Carolyn 
Abbot and the February 10, 1999 Last Will and Testament are valid, legal instruments 
and express the will of Ada Craig to dispose of her property as she intended. 
3. Defendants' claim that the 1999 documents should be set aside based upon 
a lack of competency is not supported by the evidence, and such claim is dismissed. 
4. The real property jointly owned by plaintiff and defendants should be 
partitioned and be sold. 
5. Plaintiff Robert Irvine should be appointed as Receiver to take reasonable 
and proper steps to make sure the property is in a sellable condition, sell the property, and 
divide the net sales proceeds between each of the three owners. Whatever reasonable 
expenses are necessary to make the property sellable for the benefit of each of the parties 
should be deduced from the sales proceeds, and the balance should be divided equally 
between Robert Irvine, Sharon Craig Anderson, and Colleen Craig Erickson. 
6. Each party is to bear their own attorney's fees incurred in connection with 
this action. 
7. Plaintiff is entitled to Rule 54B costs. 
8. Defendants' counterclaims are dismissed. 
9. There is no evidence supporting an Order for Accounting as requested by 
defendants, and such request is therefore denied. However, Robert Irvine shall provide 
an accounting as to the sale of the real property and distribution/) f the proceeds. 
DATED this Cf day ofJ^Sft^2t)04. 
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SHARON CRAIG ANDERSON and 
COLLEEN CRAIG ERICKSON, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR COURT APPROVAL OF 
REAL PROPERTY 
(Expedited Ruling Requested) 
Civil No. 030920001 
Judge Hanson 
Robert Irvine, as Trustee and Receiver of the real property subject to this action, 
respectfully submits this motion for Court approval of the sale of the real property under 
the terms specified below. 
FACTS 
1. This Court has appointed Robert Irvine as receiver of the property and 
directed Mr Irvine to sell the property and divide the proceeds equally between the 
parties in this action. 
2. Mr. Irvine obtained an appraisal of the property, and the appraisal showed 
an approximate value of $220,000. 
3. Mr. Irvine has worked diligently to market the property, and received an 
offer to buy the property. After offers and counteroffers, the agreed upon purchase price 
of the property will be Two Hundred Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($212,500.00). A copy of the Real Estate Purchase Contract reflecting this agreement is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
4. Based upon the appraisal, the condition of the property, and the general 
market in Salt Lake City, Mr. Irvine believes that the pending offer is a good and fair 
price for the sale of the real property. 
Based upon these facts, Mr. Irvine requests that the Court approve the pending 
sale of the property as reflected in the attached Real Estate Purchase Contract. 
REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED RULING 
Because time is of the essence on this pending sale, Mr. Irvine requests an 
expedited ruling to approve the sale. 
Dated this 4th day of February, 2005. 
CARTWRIGHT LAW FIRM, P.C. 
Jo6 Cartwright rt ri t, Attorney for 
Robert Irvine 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 4th day of February, 2005,1 served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document upon the person(s) named below by placing such 
document in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
James G. Swensen, Jr. 
Swensen & Andersen, PLLC 
136 South Main St., Suite 318 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
And also by faxing a copy of this motion to Mr. Swensen at (801) 36^510. 
Joe C^ftwright 
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D C A ! C C T A T C D H b r U A C C r r \ M T D A r > T 
I l iett THi* fe * fe^oUy rinding eorrtrset Utah tew rftqulrea reel estate *«*fit«m to u«# title form, 6w/*r *nd Sflttr, 
L J J L *« *« * • * • may «gm« lo «lt«r or dttett ftt provteletit or to </t« « tfifttivaf form. IT you tftclrv I tgt l or t«x «dvf<t. 
I W U 1 W
^ ceasitft your attorney er tax tdyteor. 
EARNEST MONEY RECE!?T 
Buyer Jun* SkolMnysbnrq offers to punches* the Property dsrcr'bed tote* «mf hereby delivers to the Brokerage*, a* 
Earnest Money, the amount of $2flQQ to the form of p e r ^ l l ? * p h , ^ which, upon Acceptance of this offer by ett partios 
(as defined In Section 23), shall be deposited in accordance with slate law. 
Racaivedby: * ? { s y > ^ W%n on \.2&.tf? (0»f»1 
«*A0«|t*6Q«f 'fOftrf Of fclfllttt Monty) 
Brokerage: lewis, Wfltttffi. ft PomfaUgftfBfa^ Phone N^moer £31-467-2100 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
1. PROPERTY: 2 5 1 E 1 7 0 0 South also described as: Tax ID# 16.18 .1B1.013 City of Salt lafrft City County of 
SflBJLate Stale of Utah, ZIP fiilJJ5{m*-Property'). 
1,1 Included Kerne. Unless excluded herein, this tale include* the following Kemt if presently owned end attached to 
the Property: plumbing, healing, air conditioning futures and equipment; ceiling tans; water heater: built-in appliances; 
light fixtures and bulbs; tiathroom flxturee; curtain*, draperies and rods; window end door screens; storm doors and 
window*: window blinds; awnings; installed television antenna; satellite dishes and system; permanently affixed carpets; 
automatic garage door oponsr and accompanying tr»ntmittcr(s); fencing; »ndi trees and shrubs. The following items shall 
also be Included In thle sale end conveyed under separate Bill of Ssle with warranties as to title: %j;qnges. /f 
refffqeratgre, Z tftshwaslrer - ?l* items ag s$en in property on 1,23.05 
1«£ Excluded kerne. The following Items are exuutjeC from fob *t*e: N/A 
14 Water Rights. The fallowing water rights are induded In this sale: all appurtenapl; rights to the property 
2. PURCHASE PRICE The purchase price for the Property is $2Qj5CQQ 
2.1 Method of Payment. Tha purchase price win be poW as follows: 
?2Q0Q (*) Esrneet Money Oepeslt. Vnder certain conditions described in this Contract, THIS 
DEPOSIT MAY BECOME iOTALLY HON-REHJN0ABL& 
x-K) &1Q4pQQ CM New Lean. Buyer agrees to a ppty for a new loan es provided In Section 2.3. Buyer will apply foe 
v \uA crtF™ * ^ ^ * "* ta,tewN **»•• TO CONVENTIONAL I J FHA { J VA 
r * ^ \ ] OTHER (specify) 
If en FHA/VA loan applies, see attached FHA/VA Loan Addendum. 
If the loan Is to Include any particular terms, then check below end give details: 
[ J SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS ! 
(c) Loan Assumption Addendum (see attached Assumption Addendum, if applicable) 
S (d) Seller Financing (sea attached Seller Financing Addendum. If applicable) 
$ (e) Other (specify). 
Jb 6^1 0 (XWf t59 f l (0 Balance of Purchase Price tn Cash at Settlement 
^ * 52QSSGQ PURCHASE PRICE. Total ^fM7??{*)^rri^(fJ 
72 Financing Condition, (check applicable boa) 
(a) [X ] Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for the applicable loan(s) 
referenced In Section 2.1(b) or (c)(the loon"). This condition Is referred to as tf*e "Financing Condition." 
(b) I ] Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for a loan. Section 2.3 
does not apply. 
2.3 Application for Loan. 
(e) Buyer"! duties. No later than the loan Application & Fee Deadline referenced in Section 24(a), Buyer shall apply 
for the Loan, "loan Application" occurs only when Buyer has: <l) completed, signed, and delivered to the lender (the 
"Lender*) the initial loon application end documentation required by the Lender, and (H) paid all loan application fee* at 
required by the Lander. Buyer agrees to diligently work to obtain the Loan. Buyer will promptly provide trie Lender with 
any additional documentation as required by the Lender. 
(b) Procedure If Loan Application Is denied, if Buyer receives written notice (rem the Lender that the Lender does 
Page 1 of C nag** Seler** Inflate ty L&J Date / ' > ^ ^ V JBuvor'ft initiate Q v Date 11 f / C j o ^ 
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rot approve the Loan (a "Notice of Loan Penlal"), Buyer shan, no later then mr*e caienoar oays inereanei. piovioB » *upy 
IO ^eiier. buyer or Seiier may, wiibin tnrve c«iend»» d*»y« »?!•• 3cw"» r^cs^ ci Sucr* r,c;;w«, v^«cs; :n;s ucnl-^ct vy 
. :-~ .~ *i ** ^. •-- =s- s ^ ::_«!*.% .u'.^r ?s*!c .^-H.-w ? f»/hV ff» !f 1fc» Mrtffes ~f LC2H 
Deposit shell bo returned to Buyer: (II) If the Notice of Loan Denial was received by Buyer after that date, the Earnest 
Money Deposit shall be released to Seller, and Seller agrees to accept ae Seller's e*cJush/o remedy the Earnest Money 
Deposit as liquidated damages, A failure to cancel as provided in this Section 2.3(b) shall have no effect on the Financing 
Condition sot forth In Section 2.2(a). Cancellation pursuant to the provisions of eny other section of true Contract shaii be 
governed by such other provisions. 
2.4 Appraisal Condition* Buyer's obligation io purchase Ui* rioveily L*\I •« i J»« NOT conditional tips*? Xxz 
r».«.. ,..**.. _- .» . , .«- . :__ • „ _ «.«.» t ^ — .fc.*.— •%***. rt . ,.-_*.__.. r>-«_— T U U ___.(:«:_,» '.„ ~*.1+*w*+A ««* «•«- fW*» "Ar>#%r•»••«! r^/irwilUVvn* If thtt n v y o i t y « p p i « i « i i t y I V I < n M i « 9 9 u N n i u f o r u i v i i o v v i n v o . »»••• *^ w«»%*.».w». •« »v-t%.**w«« *>* «•*•» «»»•«* * «f»f~«»&-••*. <——...——... . . . ^ . . -
Appraisal Condition applies and the Buyer receives written notice from the Lender that the Property has appraised far lees 
then the Purchase Price (a "Notice of Appraised Value"), Buyer may cancel this Contract by providing a copy of such 
written notice to Seller no later than three day* after Buyer's receipt of such written notice. In the event of a canceBatfon 
under this Section 2,4: (1) If the Notice of Appraised Value was received by Buyer no later than the Appraisal Deadline 
referenced in Section 24(e). the Eameet Money Deposit shall be returned to Buyer, (H) e the Notice of Appraised Value 
was received by Buyer after that dater the Earnest Money Deposit chafi be released to Seller, and Setter agrees to accept 
as Setter's excWve remedy, the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages. A failure to cancel sa provided in this 
Section 2.4 shell be 4^ettwi a waiver of the Appraisal Condition by Beyer, Cancellation pursuant to th* provisions of any 
other section of this Contract shall be governed by <*:>h other provisions. 
3. SETTLEMENT AND CLOSING. Settlement shad talce place on the Settlement Deadline referenced to Section 24(f)t or 
on a date upon which Buyer and SeBer agree In writing. "Settlement? shall occur only whan all of the following have been 
completed: (a) Buyer and Seller have signed and delivered to each other or to the escrow/closing office all documents 
required by this Contract, by the Lender, by written escrow Instructions or by applicable law; (b) any monies required to be 
paid by Suyer under these documents (exceptor the proceeds of any new Joan) have been delivered by Buyer to Selier 
or io the escrow/closing office in the form of collected or cleared funds; 9T^ (c) 9ny monies required to be paid by Setter 
under these documents have been delivered by Seller to Buyer or to the escrow/dosing office in the form of coffected or 
cleared funds. Selier and Buyer shall each pay one-half <%) of the fee charged by the escrow/closing office for its 
servicee in the eettiemenVctosrng process. Taxes and asseeements for the current year, rents, and interest on assumed 
obligations shall be prorated at Settlement as set forth in this Section. Tenant deposits (Including, but not limited to. 
security deposits, cleaning depoelts and prepaid rents) shall be paid or credited by Setter to Buyer at Settlement. 
Prorations set forth In this Section shall be made as of the Settlement Deadline date referenced in Section 24(f), unless 
otherwise agreed to hi writing by the parties. Such ^ . i ^ g £&&$ lnc/„oe the settlement statement. The transaction will be 
considered closed when Settlement has been completed, and when all of the following have been completed: (I) the 
proceeds of My new loan have been delivered by the Lender to Seller or to the escrow/dosing office; and (<(} the 
applicable Closing documents have been recorded In the office of th« county recorder. The actions described In parts (i) 
and (J!) of the preceding sentence shall be completed within four calendar days of Settlement 
4. POSSESSION, Seller shall deliver physical possession to Buyer within: [ J hours [ J days after 
closing; JXJ Other (specify) R E C O R D I N G 
5. CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Contract: 
( / ^ Seller's Mtlale 1 ^ ] Bayer's Initials 
The Listing Agent. Sandrq dnflftn / Launie Belnap. represents [X] Seller ( J Buyer ( | both Buyer end Seller 
aa a Limited Agent; 
Tne Listing Broker, JflygQn C pritchfleld. represents [XJ Seller ( I Buyer [ J both Buyer and Seller 
ae a Limited Agent; 
The Selling Agent JavmiSQn L Petersen, represents { JSetl.r [X] Buyer ( J both Buyer and Seller 
aa a Limited Agent; 
The SHIing Broker. Lifirja VVQlcott. represents t I Seller (X] Buyer ( ] both Buyer end Seller 
aa a Limited Agent; 
S. TITLE INSURANCE. At Settlement, Seller agrees to pay for a standard-coveraye owner's pottey o' title insurance 
insuring Buyer In the amount of the Purchase Price. Any additional title Insurance coverage shell be at Buyer*© BKpen^ 
7. SELLER DISCLOSURES. No later than toe Seller Disclosure Deadline referenced in Section 24(b}. Seller shall provide 
to Buyer the following documents which are coltectlvely referred to as the 'Setter Disclosures": 
(a) a Seller property condition disclosure for the P opriy. signed ac«J dated by Setter; 
(b) a commitment for the policy of trtle,jniurance: 
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M I tfrfttsn notice of a ™ * i m * 5idfar"oonitibrts known to Seller relating to environmental problems and building or 
zontna code violations: and 
(•)'oth*r (eoeciry) Hoc-iimantatlon of Zoning from SfiR 1 flKO GUY 
* , BUYER'S ??K?HT F ? CANCEL BASE* DM EVALUATIONS AWD INSPECTIONS. *uy*<* obligation to purchase 
under this Contract (check applicable boxes): 
(m) HO IS r t tS NOT conditioned upon Buyer** approval of the content of all the Seller Disclosures referenced in 
Section 7; 
f b) fX] IS f 1 IS HOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a physical condition inspection of the Property; 
(cl f I I S DC] IS NOT condRlonsd upon Buyer's approval of a survey of the Property by a licensed surveyor ("Survey); 
(eft [X ] IS t 1W NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approve of the cost terms and avatfabflty of homeowner's insurance 
coverage \or the Property; 
W W W I 1 * NOT conditioned upon Buyer** approval of the following teats ami evaluations or the property; 
(aped*} 
Pest Inspection & any oth,y tests requesiSQ DY trie OfaressipnftM romp infractor 
ff any of the above <tem$ are cnecKftd m tne affirmative, inen Sections 6 . i . 62,5.3 and 5.4 appiy, u**jmi$«, ISmf wO not 
appiy. The iiema checked fan Ihe a rwn iwy ibirm » » vC*ro£%i*wy ivmfivu *v «» »*e uVSiv«uiOna «»wmptrvwCna. v *^>*~c 
Indiyh&sit or entitles cf Buyer's choice. Seller egree* to cooper*** with th * Evaluations & inspections and with the 
w*iHc«-thraugh inspection utd*f Section 11. 
6.1 Evaluations & Inspections Deadline. No later than the Evaluation* St Inspection! Deadline referenced In Section 
24(c) Buyer Khali: (a) complete all Evaluations & inspections; and (b) determine it the Evaluations & Inspections are 
acceptable to Buyer. 
5.2 Kigm io Cancel or d e j e c t « 3uy«r determine* that the £vs&?ticns & Inspections srs unacceptable, Suycr may. 
no SaSer than tfcs gvafcations £tnspacfisna Deadline, cither {a} csnee! thfe Centred by pravkSng written notice to Seller. 
whereupon the Earnest Jersey Deposit aheJJ t?s released to Buyer; or (b) provide SeHer with written notice of obfoction*. 
9.3 Failure to ReepgttdL if by the expiration of the Evatuetions & Inspections Deadline, Buyer does not (a) cancel this 
Contract as provided in Section 3.2: or (b) deliver a written objection to Seller regarding tha Evaluations & Inspections, the 
Evaluations & Inspections shell be deemed approved by Buyer. 
6.4 Response by Seder. If Buyer provides written objections to Seller. Buyer and Seller cha» have seven calendar 
days after Salter* receipt of 8uyer*3 enactions (the "ftecponea Period") in which to agree in writing v s w thy msaxzr sf 
resoMnp Buyer's objectJonj. Except as prodded in Section 192, Selter may, but shall not be reQuired to. resofve Buyers 
objections. If Buyer and Seller have not agreed !n writing upon the manner of resolving Buyer's objections. Buyer may 
cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller no later than three calendar days after expiration of the Response 
Period; whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be releaced to Buyer. If this Contract Is not canceled by Buyer under 
en's Section 8.4, Buymt^s objections shall he ^0emod waived by Buyer. This waiver shall not affect those Items warranted 
in Section 10 
9. ADDITIONAL TERMS. There [X] ARE [ ] ARE NOT 66de^ to this Contract containing additional terms. If there 
are, the terms of the foflowing addenda are Incorporated Into this Contract by this reference: (X] Addendum No. Qf\Q 
I J Seller Flnenclog Addendum ( ] FHA/VA Loan Addendum ( ] Assumption Addendum [XJ Lead-Based Paint 
Disclosure & Acknowledgement (In some transactions this disclosure Is required by taw) ( ] Lead-Baaed Paint 
Addencfum (in some transaction© this sddondum Is required by law) £ 3 Other (specify): ; 
10. SELLER WARRANTIES AND REPRESENTATIONS. 
10.1 Condition of Title. Seier represents that Sniar has feet title to the Property and wiH convey good and marketable 
title to Buyer at Closing by general warranty deed. Buyer agrees, however, to accept title to the Property subject to the 
tolfowfng matters of record: easements, deed restrictions, CC&R't (meaning covenants, conditions *nti restrictions), end 
rights-of-way, and subject to the contents of the Commitment for Title Insurance as agreed to by Buyer under Section 8. 
Buyer also agrees to take the Property subject to existing leases affecting the Property and not expiring prior to Closing. 
Buyer agrees to be responsible for taxes, assessments, homeowners association dues, utilities, and other services 
provided to the Property after Closing. Except for any loan(s) specifically assumed by Buyer under Section 2.1(c). Seller 
win cause to be paid off by Cloifng aff mortgages, trust deeds, judgments, mechanic's liens, tax ftens and warrants. Sefier 
will cause to be paid current by Closing ait assessments and hom«cwr^ra association &;s». 
10.2 Condition of Property. Seller warrants that the Property wtU oe in the following condition OH THE DATE 
SELLER DELIVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO 8UYER: 
(a) the Property ansll be Droorn-clean ano ire* oi deons *n0 personal belongings. Any Seller or tenant 
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nw*ir*w*iated damaoe to the Property shal be reoalred at Seller's expense; 
(blFthd heating, cooling. electrical, plumbing and apnnWer systems end fixtures, and the appear*** *uu U I«H£C*» W « 
be In working order end m for Their lntenoea purposes; ^ 
(C! the raof end toundaiion snaii be fiee vf tw*** N I W H U> w5*mr; 
; J ; _ _ •*_*.., ~~~~z~~ ;*,.-. — , ,«, „ ; . . i - *".£,..\i jsr*r.!s.-«hte r*SSTC&% rsrsrf shssfi b s !f! VW5f!'.!?^S O f t ! « r • ' V J 
" 1 * > V * Pr^itvT^Trnprovemont*. Including the landscaoln^, will be In the same general condition a* they were on 
the date of Acceptance. _ 
10.3 Home Warranty Plan. I ne "Home Warranty Pian" referenced in ihis Sect'iun 15.3 & 9«p«?«t6 u««« ths 
warranties provided by S e w under 5eciiont> Iw.i *nu iv.£ w0v€u-\\#iiwvii •i»H«rv»i#iv w ^ 5 j i 
- * -* - . « : . . . . r t sent « SL^ S 5*5*5 s U A ? L . r ^ ^ J « « U I M ^ ^ U A II f*v4ivrfe/< tH» Unma WflfflWthi 
Pisn sr.o« be orcte*-2d by [ J S«ysr [ J Seller find ehsJf be issued by a company seise!** hy r 1 Buyer J 1 Seller. The 
cos! c' the Home y/srrsHty Pfen shsl not exceed $ __*____«_«««««__. and shaji be p«W for at Settfement by ( ] Buyer 
I ] Seller. 
11- WALK-THROUQH INSPECTION, 8efor* Secernent. Buyer m*y, upon reasonable notice and at a reasonable time, 
conduct a "walk-through" inspection of ihe Property to determine only that the Property is "as represented/ meaning that 
the Items referenced In Sections 1.1. B.4 and 10.2 (1he Items') are respectively present, repaired/changed as agreed, and 
in the warranted condition, if the Items ere not as represented. Seller will, prior to Settfement, replace, correct or repair the 
Items or. with the content of Buyer (and Lender H applicable), escrow an amount at Settiemenx to provide for the same. 
The failure to conduct a walk-through inspection, OT to ciaim thai an item is not as represented, shafi not constitute 8 
waiver by Buyer of the right to receive, on the data of possession, the (terns as represented. 
12. CHANGES OURINO TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that from the date of Acceptance until the date of Closing, none 
of the following shall occur without the prior written consent of Buyer: (a) no changes in any existing leasee shall be mace; 
(b) no new teases shall be entered Into: (c> no substantial alterations or )mpcovetneats to the Property shall be made or 
undertaken: and (d) no further financial encumbrances te the Property shefl be nsids. 
13* AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Seller Is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, limited flabffity company, or 
other entity, the person executing this Contract on its behalf warrants his or her authority to do so end to bind Buyer and 
Seller. 
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This Contract together with Its addenda, 8ny attached exhibits, and SeBer Disclosures, 
constitutes the entire Contract between the parties and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations, 
representation*, warranties, understanding* or contracts between the parties This Contract cennot be changed except by 
written agreement of the parties. 
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION The parties agree that any dispute, arising prior to or after Closing, related to this Contract 
(check appftcabte box) 
[XJ SHALL 
[ ] MAY AT THE OPTION OF THE PARTIES 
first be submitted to mediation. II the parties agree to mediation, the dispute shall be submitted to mediation through a 
mediation provider mutually agreed upon by the parties. Each party agrees to bear Its own costs of mediation, if mediation 
falls, the other procedures and rsmed»et available under this Contract shaU apply. Nothing in this Section 15 shall prohfbrt 
any parry from seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation. 
ie* DEFAULT, If Buyer defaults, Seller rn^y elect either to retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or to 
return It and sue Buyer to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other retr^dies available at law. If Seller defaults, In 
add-on to return of the Earnest Money Deposit. Buyer may elect either to accept from Seller a sum equal to the Earnest 
Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or may sue SeHer to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies 
sveHabte at lew If Buyer elects to accept liquidated damages, Salter agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon 
demand. It is agreed that denial of a loan Application made by the Buyer Is not a default end is governed by Section 
23(b) 
17. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS. In the event of litigation or binding arbitration to enforce this Contract, the prevailing 
party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees. However, attorney tees shall not be awarded for participation 
in mediation under Section 15. 
1 * . NOTICES. Except as provided In Section 23. all notices required under this Contract must be: (a) to writing; (b) signed 
by the party giving notice; and (c) receiveo by the other party or the other party's agent no Jater then the applicable date 
referenced In thts Contract. 
i e . ABROGATION. Except for the provision* of Sections 10.1. 10-2, 15 and 17 and express warranties made in this 
Contract, the provisions of this Contractual! not apply after Closing. 
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2© R I S K OP LOSS. All risk of loss to th8 Property, including physical damage or destruction to cne rroptmy ««»» 
improvements due to any cause except ordinary wear ano tear wo km* cau*w Dy « v^iTtg ;n e*7=r^i cc~;;:r:, ~;3:: be 
borne Dy Seser cwn me transaction «* ck***ti, 
21. TIKE ?-? O * T H i ESSENCE, rimo is of the essence regarding the dates set form MI tn»s Contract Exfonwiro w w v g 
agreed to In writing by all parties. Unless otrtsrwtee explicitly stated >n mis Contrari: {«} >*nTv* Ki»"CSJ«iCwr ssch Sc^i^': 
oFthis Contract which references a dele snail aosoiuiery be r»quin*S i?y 0-Uv i *?•* s^ourussn ; xr*z S£ i&r ^tr ~ vs*»; r^A 
\p) me term "day*"1 shaii mean calendar way* inG Si\»u t^ co'jr.icc sG i^r.rrir;* c.~ i^ vSy '0??S :^ r^  u~? •?•"«*• ^ fc— trssgers 
shaS rsot D6 3Srium9 vpor< t?t55 oorRpsRte.. termers, sppr^sers end otfe'S **?! p**"** K> this Contract, except as otherwise 
ccrs^d tc if*, vydtinc by such non—MftY 
22. ?AZ TSASSSaSSiOh? AND COUNTERPART?. Facetaito {^Xj trsnsrfiissfcn c*« signed copy of this Contract, any 
addenda and counteroffer end the retransmission of any signed tax shell be the same es delivery of an original This 
Contract ard any addenda and counteroffers may be executed In counterparts. 
23. ACCEPTANCE. "Acceptance* occurs wten Setter <?r Bayer. responding to $n off*' or counteroffer of the other: (a) 
signs 3\e offer or counteroffer where noted to indicate acceptance; and ip) communicates to the other party or to the other 
pztt/s sgent tnet the o^er or eotjnfctfoffer has taaart sfanad as required. 
24. CONTRACT O&AOLffiE$. Buyer and SeSer 3g,«* that fr* fcSovring de&4ftn*3 she? eppfy to this Contract: 
(a) Losn AppSfcs^on $ Fee Deadline 
(b) $ f (fer Ddcfeeum QeadMne 
(c) EvaHiatlotis & Inspections Deadline 
(d) Loan Dental Deadline 
(e) Appraise* Deadline 




°yr>Y^ w t r t ^ 
-tVy'g V N ^ ^ ^ 
*»^ »»»—»- * • 
25. OFFER ANO TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purches* the Property on o» above terms and conotttons. if . 
S««t»r doos not accept thte oH*r by. ffi'.fju \ ] AM [XJ PM Mountain Tlm« o^'™"* - K * ' « * S « K « * »»-«^I 




P * » ) 
pete) 
c?^ Q-Jjz*u*Jp<*J: LL2J •L „V,./. 0^v^ZU?,2^? 
IJHryer's Signature) O "^rferUate) (Suyers Signature} (Offer Osta) 
The later of the above Offer Dates shall oe refernsd 10 as the rOff«r Rwfcrenc# Date" 
(Buyers' Names) {PLEASE PRINT) 
4362 § Peno Or, Waai Vattey City, 
U I 6412Q 801,239,0229 
(Notice Address) (Zip Code) (Phone) 
Page 5 of d p«ges Seller's lnktotsj M- .Pete > ^ 0 ^//>l_CSuv€r'sJn^als,, 
^ 
.Date, iM^" 
F e b 0 2 05 0 3 : 1 5 p j o h n fcgrton a n d e r s o n 1 8 0 1 7 ^ 3 5 7 7 0 p . 5 
FROM ":Y0UR PxEfiLTOR SANPPsA GILL6N FPX NO. :1 801 268 4138 J3n. 25 29(35 08:d0Ri p© 
JSN-P5-PSS5 ia:42 FK^:Kt^aKrPJRES 1S013E103?! TQiSSSn^ P.6 
J J ACCEPTANCE OF QFFI* TO PMRCMASE: Seller Accepts the foregoing offer on the term* and condition* specified 
ebovo^ 
{i^wCUNTE^CFf": ScSsrprsssnis fef Bvytft Accsptsne* £** t£?W €* B**y**** off** aubjact to the exceptions or 
rftSXftfe&gn* at^ ujeptfiftg in the attached ADDENDUM NO. ^^J&j^gU*-
/-h>~#y 7/M £**. 
(S*l«rtc 81s<i*!uf*} {Data} (Time) (Setter's Signature) (Dale) (Time) 
(Setters* Names} (PLEASE PRINT) (Notice Address) (2p Code) (Pnona) 
C ] K£JgCTlOalr $*Bar reject* the foregoing offer. 
(SaitefliStanatufel (Date) (Time) (Seflec's Signature) (Oate) (Tima) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
State taw require* Broker to furnish Buyer and $tH*r with copies of this Contract beertog al etgnecuros. IHH tn applicable 
socbon beiow.) 
A . I £ f ± £ £ * ? ! ± e k * * * » * * » * » nf m final ^yrj^ * f t h * foiwi<*f*1 f!r#nTr<lct hoarffUl * f l l<ffirwtljrP3t' 
(Suysf'a Signature} (D219) (Buys*'* S/ytaluf*) (O*'*.' 
(^4 hvt-irz 
(Seder's Signature) (Oate) (Salter's Signature) (Oate J 
6. i personally caused e fmai copy 01 ine foregoing Conifad beat'rig aii signatufvi w t v [ J ***** \ j fitStfoi { I &•«;• 
^ w i i ^ ^ a r f .-Ut IPk^4^% ».*~A~~». f+m^m^UI «**4U« f t e>^IUw» f I D m M f 
v r c n r o r a a wn
 1 . I .n ,. . .| x y+tBvmjt | M « w ) f * r%*i^mrw9 w »•«• ^ j <*»»••«• ^ j «^.jr««« 
Sent/Delivered by (specif/). 
T K « ?CS3J A?«*OV£0 5V T«S UTA« RSAi. S5TAT5 CO«*!««OSf AMD *HE C*F!C£ Of TMS UTAH ATTORHEY QEfflsftAL. 
EFFECTJVC AUOU5T & 290*. IT RCFLAtES A K D S JPf^SEDES A U PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF T H » FORM. 
Page 6 of 6 psgve Setters InKiefrfl/fcA* Oate l~^6 &£~ cBuvws ^ n t o i j Q f d _ Date Ml /» ^ ^ 
v 
Feb 02 05 0 3 : 1 G P John p t o n anderson 1 801 7 ^ 5 7 7 0 p . 6 
FROM :Y01_IR PPOLTHP qONHPA H I ! I PN rax NH :1 .qp)1 ?t& d 1 T O T A O PS PflflS H « : ^ q p M P 7 
JPN-25-2005 18:44 F^:mjST&UCTJftc$ 190132103?! 5Ut i * * * l ib * . * 
i " 
r g y ? » xn
 L | t 
TO 
RfcAL fcbTAf fc P U K ^ H H S t C U W I K A U I 
^n \JH9f KOTOfBnpe P i R * OF y J V i * 1 l**^-i » X - t ^ C V - y ittvfcKiviy «« * M * A « w w « ^ « oi iu vwMmwvic io , «^ a«.rv«rcn* 
i cy^ raAvjn i ^ v i o r i u|Avi ijr I V M M « U o% ^ _ _ . _ - . - - _ . .. . - _ — 
f jJ l ru-J-W^, 1 , , „ , -p,,-^ f^_,r-
» Vf iH<; n o r T^x>rpvc<i- tefi- (iMx^—YMtrcr i Sdvf'rvW/1 
fl*-4Vv2*- oofVU^ w 
VftM. ~ 
BUYER ANO SELLER AGREE THAT THE CONTRACT DEADLiKES REFERENCED Wi SECTiCft 24 Of T ^ REPC 
{CHECK APPL&ASLE SOX): ^ T REMA.%* fJMCHA£SED [ J ARE CHAttSED AS FCVtOSfS: 
To the extent the isrra of tftfc ADDENDUM mod?y or conSc! with any provisions of the REPC. Including efl prfor addenda 
tfon23cftheREP6 provisions of Sec i   cf the REPC. Unless so accepted* the offer as sat forth m this ADDENDUM Shalt lapse, 
^ f - 7 ^ ^ 
(Time) ( ] Buyer I J Se»*r SlgneUire (Date) (T>me) 
ACCEPTANCecOUNTEROFFEFVREJECTtQM 
ChCCKONE: 
{ ] ACCEPTANCE; [ 1 Setter { J Buyer hereby accepts the terms of tba ADDENDUM. 
t ^CWMTERjbFFER; f J Seller (-^f6uyer presents as a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO. .yL 
/^H^> *7>0if f. M, 
(Signatura) (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (Time) 
t } REJECTION: [ ] Seller [ 1 Buyer rejects the foregor\g ADDENDUM. 
(Signatuie) (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) ( T t ^ T 
THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTOKHCY QZHW*-r 
EFFECTIVE AUGUST fl. 2003 IT REPLACES AftO SUPER CEDE 8 ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM. 
•mills Form 1-A 
Feb 02 05 0 3 : 1 6 P John b ^ t o n anderson 1 801 7 ^ 5 7 7 0 p . 7 
FR0T1 CYOUR REALTOR SQNDRA GILLEN FAX NO. :i 861 268 4138 Jan. 26 200S 05:55PM PI 
0 1 / 2 C / 0 5 TOO ta:R2 FAX 801 321 1135 LDSH XUTR1T10N SI.TFQRT ft™* 
Page! of 1 
ADDENDUM NO. Jmt H ". TO REAL ESTAlfc PURCHASE CONTRACT 
THIS 19 AN (XI ADDENDUM ( J COUNTEROFFER 10 Wat REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (lh* -RF^C*) urith 
an Offer Refarence Oat* of January ?$. 2Q0S Including ell prior addenda ano counteroffers, between JuQfit 
SkotlinyshttrQ *$> Buyer, and , a* Selter, regarding the Property located 
H |?S1^17QQS Salt Lafry pity. Salt Lakp County. UT B ^ 
part of the REPC: 
InPtrongre nrlcg.ttt.tee t?1? Sffl 
BUYER AND 3ELLER AOREE THAT THE CONTRACT DEADLINES REFERENCED IN SECTION 24 OF THE REPC 
(CHECK APPLICABLE OOX»: fXJ REGAIN UNCHANGED I 1 ARE CHANGED AS FOLLOWS: '_ 0d 
To toe extant the term* of thts ADDENDUM modify or conflict with an> provtsiottK of the REPC including oft prior addenda 
and counteroffer*, these terms shall control. Alt pther term* of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers, 
not modified by mi* ADDENDUM shea remain the same [X] Setter [ J Buyer shad have until 8:00 f J AM (XJ f*M 
Mountain Tim© on January 26 2005 (Date), 4 mxnpt the term* ot ite* ADDENDUM k\ aocordanc* wih tr.e provision 
cf Suction £3 of the REPC. Unless so accepted, the offer as set foftri in thi* ADDENDUM «hai« lapso. 
l)4<gyy«r{ J Seller Signature O ^{Date). (Time) ( JBu \ P , y«r{ ) seller Signature pate) {Timo) 
ACCEPTANCE/CCKWTEROFFER/REJECTION 
CHECK ONE: y 
M ACCfiPTAfilCE: MfSe&er £ J Buyer herotiy accepts the ternis of this ADDENDUM 
rFER; I J S«H«r { I Buyer preWnfc* a* a coumorotTO" the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO 
tStgnolufo) {Date) (Tune) (Signature) (Date) (Timei 
{ ] REJECTION: ( ] Sailer [ I Buyer rcjeste tho fmegoing ADDENDUM. 
(Signature) (Dato) (Time) (SlgnaUirw) (Date) (Time) 
THIS FORM APWOVBO OX THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AMD TMG OFRCE OF THS UTAH ATTORNEY C6N6RAL. 
BFF6CTIVE AUGUST 5, 2003. IT REPLACES AND SUPER9EPES ALL PREVlOOSLr APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM. 
Complaint 
dated September 3,2003 
C 
O 
M 
P 
L 
A 
I 
N 
T 
